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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents the organizational model of a hypothetical national black bank
holding company, the First Nubian National Bank, as an agent of constructive
consolidation and enhanced capital market efficiency within the industry of historically
black-owned banks (HBBs).
In the U.S., the history of slavery, segregation and legal discrimination against
African-Americans drove the creation of several parallel service industries for Black
consumers who were refused service by whites. Although "Free persons of color" had
been involved in banking since the 1600s, the U.S. Congress actually created the Black
banking industry by chartering the Freedman's Bank in 1865. The magnitude of
Freedman's nationwide failure in 1874 led to the development of a fragmented black
banking industry made up of many small, community-based institutions located
throughout the southern United States and in most major urban clusters.
Between 1888-1930 at least 134 such institutions were founded in the U.S. Today only
55 remain of which 38 are commercial banks. The pace of consolidation has been
quickened first by integration, then by significant customer defections to larger, major-
market banks, and most recently by the rapidly changing competitive nature of the
banking industry. Recently HBBs have been plagued by high transaction costs,
unusually high non-interest expense, and little financial innovation. This thesis analyzes
how a national bank holding company could resolve these issues by leveraging the cost
structure of larger, major market banks to capture synergies and economies. The model
can help affiliated HBBs improve their operating efficiency, their delivery of products
and services, and the overall performance of their roles as financial intermediaries in
the capital market systems of their target communities.
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Thesis Statement
The industry of historically black-owned banks(HBBs) suffers from market
inefficiencies characterized by high transaction costs, unusually high non-interest
expenses, and little financial innovation. This has created a significant market
opportunity for larger commercial and investment banks to gain market share in this
industry by creating fee-related businesses which leverage their economies of scale and
investments in innovations. In partnership with a national black bank holding company,
large and diversified financial institutions can help the affiliated HBBs improve their
operating performance, develop competitive advantages, and make more efficient
capital markets in their target communities.
Statement of Problem
Although legally sanctioned segregation has been abolished for about thirty years in
America, there still exists de facto segregation in many U.S. communities, both rural
and urban. Slavery, segregation, and legal discrimination against people of African
descent have led to the creation of a parallel black economy with its own manufacturing
and service sectors. Many black-owned and operated firms were created to service the
personal and professional needs of African-Americans in segregated communities.
Black hair care manufacturers, insurance companies, and banks have been major
employers as well as sources of capital reinvestment and economic stability in
segregated black communities since the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These were
often national industries with many single-market firms. For example, black-owned
newspapers appeared in isolation in every major African-American consumer market.
By 1905 The New York Age had become one of the most prominent African-American
newspaper in the country by reporting on the progress of "the negro in both north and
south"'1 . However, geography and discrimination by truck drivers and newspaper
distributors prohibited early black newspaper companies in cities like New York,
Atlanta, and Philadelphia from being broadly distributed. The Chicago Defender
became the first truly national African-American newspaper by devising a creative
solution to this problem. Management began using A. Philip Randolph's Union of
Pullman Car Porters as distributors to deliver The Defender and its national news of
race progress and problems to every community of blacks throughout the south and in
northern cities. In a very similar, market-driven fashion, African-Americans created
historically black-owned banks to facilitate borrowing and lending among members of
black communities. If slavery and its ensuing racial caste system of segregation were
peculiar institutions, then the parallel black industries and firms that developed as a
1J.H. Harmon, Jr., "The Negro as a Local Business Man"; The Journal of Negro History, ed. by Carter
G. Woodson, Vol. XIV, No.2 April 1929
result were also quite unique. These companies were designed and built solely to
respond to the needs of households and firms in their target markets. In this respect, the
HBBs developed as the only source of financial intermediation in most of these
communities. Segregation created geographical, social, and economic lines of
demarcation which were never crossed. Black households and firms could not cross
these boundaries because they were forbidden access to other institutions, while non-
blacks chose not to cross because they already had access to larger, more efficient
capital and consumer markets. Consequently most historically black firms(HBFs) and
some entire industries were ceded franchises or territories which were protected by the
legal and de facto segregation of these markets. Certain industries, like banking and
publishing, which require economies of scale could never support many firms in such
small, regulated markets. For this reason, many banks and newspapers in these
protected markets often developed in the absence of competition. And like banking
sectors in general, no institutions were better indicators of the economic status of
African-American households and firms in these segregated markets than the HBBs.
Out of 134 HBBs which were founded between 1888 and 1933, only eight (8) survived
the Depression. By 1979 the number of black-owned, full-service commercial banks
had risen to 52. That number fell to 45 by 1985 and to 38 by 1991. Several forces
explain the decline, the most important of which is the lower standard of living at the
core of what remains of these racially segmented markets. Two major civil rights
movements and major market forces conspired to bring sweeping social and economic
changes to the HBBs' target markets which did not bode well for their businesses. In
the 1970s, President Richard Nixon responded to his predecessor's call for affirmative
action by launching a Black Capitalism campaign which sought to aid and support the
continued development of historically black firms(HBFs) in their target markets.
During the Nixon years many Republican lawmakers like former President George
Bush were able to develop constructive support among civil rights groups because of
their support for Nixon's community economic development policies which advocated
small business development by racial minorities as an alternative to Great Society
poverty programs. These programs included setting aside percentages of federal
contracts for historically black firms to support employment in segregated markets. The
success of affirmative action programs in hiring and small business development
increased the size and average income of the black middle class. Simultaneously,
concessions by non-blacks in the areas of social and educational integration allowed
more black middle class professionals to move up and out of the HBBs' geographic
markets altogether. In addition, the Community Reinvestment Act(CRA) of 1977 was
created to encourage the larger commercial banks to provide credit to all neighborhoods
equally. In response to 1989 and 1990 Federal Reserve studies which showed that
banks rejected same-income blacks for mortgages at three (3x) the rate of non-blacks2,
Congress has recently sought increased enforcement of CRA. In essence, the
government is now urging the major money-center banks to extend full-service
commercial banking into predominantly black, segregated markets which they had
historically either ignored entirely or targeted for deposit-taking activities only. Thus,
the pace of consolidation in the industry of HBBs was quickened first by integration,
then by significant customer defections to larger, major-market banks, and most
recently by the rapidly changing competitive, nature of the global banking industry.
Today's separation of the races, though no longer backed up by the force of law has
become even more acute in some areas of education, economics, and commercial
expansion. There exists entire communities and cities within cities in America which
are grossly underdeveloped. By every modern measure of living standards (whether it
2Income-specific studies only were criticized by banks for not controlling for credit history, net worth,
and length of employment, all variables which community activists claim are biased.
........... r
be employment, life expectancy, education, health care, average income or net worth),
segregated inner-city and rural communities of blacks compare more favorably with
lesser-developed, third world nations than with even the worst performing U.S. states.
This dramatic downturn in black America's economic indicators can be traced to the
early 80s, which witnessed the beginning of the longest continuous period of economic
growth in U.S. history. HBFs did not participate because the administration of
President Ronald Reagan completely rejected the Nixon program of Black Capitalism in
favor of a broad policy of de-regulation and free-market, open competition. In fact, the
Reagan Justice Department brought suits against states and municipalities which had
implemented policies modeled after Nixon's. This dramatic sea shift put historically
black firms and households in a position of uncertainty. Indeed, the recent rate of social
integration, market de-regulation, and technological changes which began in the 1980s
has created a completely different competitive environment for HBBs and their home
markets. The problem they face is endemic to all of the historically black firms and
industries which rose up to serve segregated markets. The social and macroeconomic
changes within these communities were exacerbated for the HBBs by the structural de-
regulation of the banking industry itself in 1980. As the firewalls that surrounded those
economies and protected markets come down, these firms have had the need to re-
position themselves for competition and growth in this post-civil rights, backlash period
of social and economic de-regulation. Some industry-wide identity crises have resulted
from an environment of uncertainty for these institutions in which they wrestle with
decisions to expand outside of their racial and/or geographic segments. The HBBs are
experiencing severe competition from both major market banks in the high end which
cherrypick the best commercial and black middle class customers, and non-bank
competitors in the low end which finance appliances and cash checks for the working
poor. Only the most allocationally and operationally efficient firms would be positioned
to take advantage of the sudden de-regulation of certain markets and industries; and
unfortunately the HBFs are at a competitive disadvantage because of their size and their
historical confinement to a racially segregated market. They are now attracting less
than their historical share of both the community's market for banking customers and
its labor market for banking professionals. In addition, it is more difficult for HBBs
and other historically black-owned firms to attract competitively-priced capital to fund
their assets because of the real and perceived additional riskiness of their customer
base. If these firms are to exist into their second century, then they must continuously
craft solutions as creative as The Chicago Defender's and the Pullman Porters' with
which they can service today's increasingly, market-driven black communities as
effectively as they served their constitutionally-segregated markets during the absence
of competition.
Proposed Solution: National Bank Holding Company Organizational Model
This thesis offers an organizational model for a national bank holding company. The
First Nubian National Bank (NuBank) would be a functional, private-sector solution for
the problem of mispriced and misplaced capital in America's underdeveloped
communities. NuBank, as a portfolio of HBBs, could collaborate with large commercial
banks and investment banks to rent their back offices and otherwise leverage their
investments in technology and new products which small banks have not been able to
make. The result would be the delivery of better services and the reduction of
transaction costs for depositors and borrowers in distressed communities. Although the
risk premium for marginal borrowers is not expected to entirely dissipate, the return of
volatile depositors to the HBBs will increase the supply of capital which remains in
those communities with which it can meet more of its internal credit needs.
Through partnerships and joint ventures, the holding company would allow large,
national banks to leverage their cost bases for distribution of products and services to
customers of HBBs in economically distressed communities. These major market banks
would benefit from the arrangement by gaining access to new segments of the
consumer market and a source of untapped savers/investors. NuBank would serve as
somewhat of a distributor or wholesaler which could facilitate the delivery of branded
financial products through the HBBs, which are established retail outlets in their home
communities.
For example, NuBank could negotiate a private label credit card issue with Citicorp on
behalf of all its affiliate HBBs. GE Capital could be solicited to provide mortgage
services and help NuBank broker bundled mortgages in the secondary market to fund
additional housing in HBB markets. In addition, NuBank could create a joint venture
with Fidelity to market its family of mutual funds through HBB branches. And
Baybanks could leverage its technology investments in the proprietary Baybanks X-
Press 24 Card infrastructure to help make ATMs and around-the-clock banking readily
accessible to households in more HBB communities. NuBank would add significant
value to each of its partners, constituents, and investors in the following ways:
To Affiliated HBBs
1. Greater profitability due to the lower salary and non-interest expenses from
consolidation, sharing technology and collapsing back office systems.
2. Leveraged bank products & services help attract capital back to system by
lowering transaction costs and other disincentives to depositors/investors.
3. Management assistance and consulting to improve operating efficiency.
4. Access to global capital markets lowers average cost of capital.
To Target Market (Consumers in Distressed Communities)
1. Better transactional services at lower cost
2. Lower credit costs due to lower cost of banks' funds and increased capital
market efficiency.
3. Supply of internal capital organized to meet community's internal demand.
To Financial Service Providers
1. Organization of new opportunity to access captive market of historically
segregated banking consumers.
2. Diversification of risk by emphasis on fee-generating businesses.
To NuBank Investors
1. High quality stream of cash flows from fee-dominated businesses
2. Upside equity participation in affiliated HBBs with most growth potential.
By delivering new product lines in conjunction with proprietary and value-added, non-
bank financial services, NuBank would be able to redress the imperfections in the
capital markets of historically segregated communities. The holding company could
powerfully re-position its affiliate HBBs for competitiveness against bank and non-bank
entrants into its target markets by becoming a superhighway for information
technology, financial innovation, and low-cost capital leveraged from large diversified
financial institutions. Significant reductions in transaction costs, market friction, and
the consumers' information search costs would combine to create a powerful incentive
to lure potential depositors and lenders back into the branches of their local HBB.
These black households and firms have been trapped for years in an inefficient, parallel
capital market which has consistently charged them higher net interest margins and
transaction costs. Meanwhile, it stubbornly lagged in passing on the market efficiencies
available in more developed parts of the economy. From their perspective, this banking
superhighway connecting their local HBB branch with the innovations developed and
the efficiencies gained in global capital markets may be viewed as more of an
underground railroad which can lead them to freedom from paying a historical
premium for both borrowing and lending.
Underlying Assumptions
This thesis and the accompanying assertions made here about the social and economic
value which can be gained by the creation of NuBank is based upon three underlying
assumptions about capital market theory as it is applied to historically segregated
markets. Since they drive this analysis, the following underlying assumptions will be
explored individually: 1) Capital markets in historically segregated communities are
imperfect and function relatively poorly; 2) Historically high transaction costs have
driven many households away from HBBs as traditional sources of financial
intermediation; 3) Lowering the costs of transactional and other value-added services
will help recapture depositors needed to increase the supply of capital required for
meeting corresponding credit needs. Lack of available consumer credit or fairly priced
credit for households and firms in these communities is not the problem. It is merely an
aggravated symptom of the underlying financial condition which is underdevelopment
of market structures relative to those that are available to most American communities.
Analysts who assume these effects would not seek solely a credit-driven solution. They
recognize that if capital supply is not the problem, then throwing credit at the
community alone is not a complete solution.
A glance at the former Soviet Union offers a constructive parallel. Their lack of
adequately developed market structures in both the product and capital markets is the
reason why loan guarantees alone are not expected to result in the successful growth of
capitalism there. By comparison, the historically segregated markets in America have
been tremendously successful in supporting the growth of a parallel, market-driven
economy which has developed many different industries and hundreds of very
competitive firms. However some industries and product markets developed more
competitively in parallel than the capital market. Manufacturers in the black hair care
and cosmetics industries have often been industry leaders in product and service
innovations. For example, Revlon and Avon have been recruiting professional
managers from firms like Soft-Sheen and Johnson Products for over 10 years now. In
addition, Gillette acquired two historically black firms: Lustra-Silk, a hair care
company,and Jaffra, a black cosmetics company modeled after Avon. In both cases
Gillette retained the management and integrated them into their own personal care
divisions. The efficiency of some parallel industries may be related to the relative
sophistication of black consumer demand in certain product categories; whereas
information asymmetries about financial markets supported the development of
imperfections in their parallel money market.
Acceptance of these assumptions leads directly to the analysis that better market
efficiency should be sought through innovation-sharing and the empowering of the
HBBs which have historically been the financial intermediaries and money market-
makers in those communities. This thesis offers NuBank as a private sector initiative
which would extend to these historically segregated communities the benefits of
synergies, economies, and access to global capital markets. By increasing the efficiency
of their parallel capital market, NuBank would become an agent of constructive
consolidation in the HBB industry. This is a far better long-run response to the steady
decline of savings, investment, employment, and other macroeconomic indicators
which has been witnessed in historically segregated communities since the 1980s.
Chapter 2 Historical Survey of Black
Banking Industry
19th Century Private Banking
First Banks for Negroes
Freedman's Savings and Trust Company
Foundation of HBB Industry, 1888-1934
Growth of HBB Industry, 1962-1979
Consolidation of HBB Industry, 1980-Present
Today's HBB Industry-Summary Statistics
Asset Size
Profitability
Solvency
Lessons Learned
Today there are thirty-eight historically black-owned banks(HBBs) in the United States.
These institutions are the survivors of an industry which originally sprang up to satisfy
the need for financial intermediation in the agricultural and rural economies of
numerous southern communities of ex-slaves and free persons of color in the late 19th
century. In its early years the industry experienced rapid growth, during which time
over 134 such institutions were founded. However only 8 of these HBBs survived the
collapse of the banking system in 1933. The industry did not again experience
significant growth until the Civil Rights and Black Nationalism movements began to
reach into the major urban clusters in the 1960s. Between 1962-1979 the number of
HBBs grew from 10 to 52. Since 1980, however, consolidation has taken hold.
Appendix A is a list of these firms by asset size and the year they were founded3.
Though First Tuskegee Bank, the oldest remaining HBB, was founded in 1894; there is
evidence of African American involvement in formal banking as early as 1833.
19th Century Private Banking
At an 1851 convention of free Negroes in New York, it was reported in one of the
sessions that Negroes had between $40,000-$50,000 in savings on deposit at Wall
Street banks4. This had to be accomplished with the help of white abolitionists and
other anti-slavery advocates because statutes existed which made it illegal for Negroes
to hold shares or make deposits into most state-chartered banks. Nonetheless, many
free Negroes prior to the Civil War had accumulated enough income and savings to get
into the business of money-lending to others. Often, they either lent their own funds or
combined them with funds entrusted to them by the less thrifty or educated of their
race.
3 Appendix A only includes commercial banks still in existence. It does not include savings & loan
institutions or historically black banks which have failed.
4 Arnett G. Lindsay, "The Negro in Banking"; The Journal of Negro History, ed.by Carter G. Woodson,
Vol. XIV, No.2 April 1929; p. 15 8
Table 1
Free Negro Money Lenders (1833-1860)
Name Profession City/State Net Worth*
Joseph Cassey - Philadelphia, PA $ 75,000
Thorny Lafon Dry Goods New Orleans, LA 413,000
Cyprian Ricaud Real Estate Broker New Orleans, LA -
Stephen Smith Private Banking Columbia, PA 500,000
John C. Stanley - New Berne, NC 50,000
Peter Van Dyke Private Banking New York, NY 500,000
* Net wealth measured in 1860 dollars.
Table 1 shows a partial listing of some of these early pioneers in African-American
banking. A major segment of the black private banking business in the 1850s was
pooling funds from free Negroes and white abolitionists to lend to fugitive slaves. The
runaway slaves who wanted to stay in this country would borrow money to buy their
own freedom and that of their slave families from owners in the South. The lenders
would then arrange work for the ex-slave in northern cities with which he could repay
the loan.
First Banks for Negroes
Another convention of abolitionists and free Negroes met in New York in 1855 to
discuss the establishment of a depository institution for free Negroes. At that time they
reported that the amount of Negro savings on deposit in New York banks had risen to
over $600,0005. Restrictive laws against Negroes' holding of real and/or financial
assets varied by state. Though most anti-slavery states repealed laws prohibiting literacy
among free Negroes, many still denied them the legal rights to patronize banks or to
5Ibid. p.159
create their own financial institutions. Since Negroes themselves were still defined as
chattel by the Constitution, every principality was free to interpret their rights to
accumulate wealth as the local community saw fit. Pre-occupation with the war to end
slavery delayed the movement to create a bank for Negroes until the U.S. Army took
up the issue in 1864.
The Union Army had created an allotment system to encourage soldiers to save their
earnings and send them home. Massachusetts abolitionists, who had been instrumental
in getting the Army to allow free Negroes to fight, also advocated a similar allotment
system be arranged for the Negro soldier. The system allowed soldiers to allot a certain
percentage of their pay to a relative or to a savings account in his own name. This was
adopted in 1864, and Negro soldiers were soon able to save large amounts in this way.
Some commanders of Negro regiments, who essentially became provincial governors of
conquered territory in the South, took the practice even further. General N.P. Banks,
consumed with a desire to see newly-freed slaves in New Orleans become "more thrifty
and reliable", organized the Free Labor Bank solely to serve Negroes. It immediately
became a beacon for free Negroes in that city who had already been engaged in the
accumulation of wealth. In addition to receiving the wages of Negro soldiers stationed
in New Orleans, the Free Labor Bank received a large deposit from a neighborhood
association of free Negroes called the "Rost Host Colony". This deposit was well noted
by Army commanders for two reasons. Firstly, they were often unaware of the
existence of an almost underground free Negro society, especially in the South; and
secondly because the size of the deposit ($21,605.83) led them to believe that they
could significantly impact the deposit base of such institutions. By the end of the Civil
War, there were military savings banks for Negroes in most regiments including at the
two major staging areas for Negro soldiers during the war: Norfolk, VA & Beaufort,
SC. Negro soldiers had in excess of $200,000 on deposit at their military bank in
Beaufort. When the war ended, many commanders and abolitionists were united in
their desire to see a major savings institution which would encourage thriftiness among
all Negroes. However it was Army Paymaster, A.M. Perry who devised the idea of
using the unclaimed deposits of Negro soldiers at their military banks to form the basis
of a savings bank for freed slaves.
Freedman's Savings and Trust Company
Another Army official, John W. Alvord, began to develop plans for a bank for
Negroes in collaboration with Perry. They enlisted the aid of prominent military and
political leaders in Washington to inform Congress of the value of this enterprise to the
nation and to the freed slaves at a time when one of the options the government was
weighing was repatriating all the freed slaves back to Africa. In 1865 the Congress
approved an act incorporating the Freedman's Savings & Trust Company, due partially
to President Abraham Lincoln's indecision regarding the re-patriation issue. On March
3rd, when the president signed it into law, Lincoln remarked that, "This bank is just
what the freedmen need." However, the following excerpt from Section V of the act of
incorporation belies the reality of the bank's operations, which is that it was always
designed to use the deposits of the freedman as liabilities to fund the assets of others:
"the general business and object of the corporation hereby created shall be to
receive on deposit such sums of money as may from time to time be offered, therefor
by or on behalf of persons heretofore held in slavery in the United States or their
descendants and to invest the same in stocks, bonds, treasury notes and other securities
of the United States. "6
The bank went on to open over 34 branches in cities throughout the north and south
before it was declared insolvent in 1874. The bank was organized and managed
6Ibid. p.163
exclusively by white "friends of the freedman" who were connected either to
Congressmen, the Army, or abolitionist interests. In its inception, the promise of
Freedman's idea captured the imagination of every Negro in the nation. Both the ex-
slave and the smaller community of free Negroes viewed it as the most appropriate
vehicle to continue their efforts at capital accumulation. The bank was viewed as
synonymous with The Freedman's Bureau which was a government agency created to
help ex-slaves assimilate into southern society. And the government, after transferring
the assets of the Negro military savings banks to this new private institution, continued
to encourage Negroes to utilize these branches. Because of the same names and the fact
that the Union Army continued their occupation of the South throughout this first
period of Reconstruction, it was easy for Negroes to assume that their deposits were
safe. This public deception was chronicled in a 1929 edition of The Journal of Negro
History:
"Here we find a bank organized, sponsored, and operated for Negroes with
governmental aid. At first it adhered to safe and sound banking principles...the fact that
men of unquestionable character and unusual ability were advertised as incorporators
[some, even, without their knowledge] together with the report that the United States
Government protected the savings which were deposited inspired confidence and made
easy the organization of the Freedman's Savings Bank and Trust Company. "'
The Journal went on to point out that the passbooks of the bank even bore the
inscription: "The government of the United States has made this bank perfectly safe."
It is in this environment, between 1865-1874 , that Negroes across the country put all
of their hopes and practically all of their money into the Freedman's bank. From 1865-
1869 the headquarters of the bank was in New York. It was managed very well during
that period by private sector bankers who considered the position a public trust. In
7Ibid. p.163
A
1870, the headquarters moved to Washington, D.C., and the bank became politicized.
It became known for highly speculative investments and patronage. The Journal
chronicles how a Mr. Vandenbrung was able to borrow $30,000 on the verbal
endorsement of Henry D. Cooke, the first territorial governor of the District of
Columbia. And Cooke's cousin Jay, of Jay Cooke & Company, financiers, borrowed
$500,000 at 5% interest while the rate then being paid depositors was 6%. The Journal
offered its own interpretation of why Freedman's failed:
"...authoritative sources record even grosser irregularities in this bank. Its
growth had been especially rapid, too rapid, moreover, for the corrupt and unprincipled
white officials to develop it into a sound financial institution. One half of the branches
which were established were unprofitably operated, and yet many more could have
been set up. Inefficient accounting with little or no check up was followed by
misappropriation of funds, and consequent withdrawal of the honest and competent
officials. Unwise loans and the exorbitant 6 per cent interest which was paid on savings
were also contributing causes to the failure of the bank. As one clerk put it, 'when the
cash balanced, all of us went out to celebrate the event.' There were, of course, many
other causes but the most obvious cause was the audaciously planned schemes of the
officers to fill their own pockets, to feather the nests of their business associates and
friends who had formed cliques, rings and other combines for selfish gains."8
Frederick Douglass, the former slave, abolitionist and diplomat, was appointed
president of Freedman's in the eleventh hour to restore the confidence of Negroes in
the bank. Though he had no banking background, Douglass surprised management by
immediately declaring the bank insolvent and calling for its closure. Douglass' motive
in using his influence and opposing the bank's Board to get the bank to cease operations
was to protect future Negro depositors. In his autobiography, he remarks, "..the fact is,
and all investigations show it, that I was married to a corpse." By the time the
government finally stepped in to close down this operation, $3.2 million of Negroes'
savings on deposit was lost. The financial crisis which followed affected almost every
8Ibid. p.1 66
black family in the nation. About 61,000 black depositors lost practically all of their
life savings. 9
Table 2
Freedman's Savings Bank & Trust Company
Amount of Deposits at the Branches
January 24, 1874
Branches Denosits Branches Denosits
Alexandria, VA
Atlanta, GA
Augusta, GA
Baltimore, MD
Beaufort, SC
Charleston, SC
Columbus, MS
Columbia, TN
Huntsville, AL
Jacksonville, FL
Lexington, KY
Little Rock, AK
Louisville, KY
Lynchburg, VA
Macon, GA
Memphis, TN
Mobile, AL
Montgomery, AL
$21,584
28,404
96,882
303,947
55,592
255,345
18,857
19,823
35,963
22,022
34,193
17,728
137,094
19,967
54,342
96,755
95,144
29,743
Natchez, MS
Nashville, TN
New Bern, NC
New Orleans, LA
New York, NY
Norfolk, VA
Philadelphia, PA
Raleigh, NC
Richmond, VA
Savannah, GA
Shreveport, LA
St. Louis, MO
Tallahassee, FL
Vicksburg, MS
Washington, DC
Total
22,195
78,525
40,621
240,006
344,071
126,337
84,657
26,703
166,000
153,425
30,312
58,397
40,207
114,348
384,789
$ 3,299,201
The impact of the Freedman's failure on the collective psyche of African-Americans
was felt for generations. A strong communal distrust of banks understandably
9John P. Kelly, "The Origins of Minority Banking"; NBA Today
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developed. As stories of the collapse were passed on, African-Americans used their
mattress to protect their savings for decades. It became extremely difficult for free
Negroes in captive black communities to resume the practices of private banking which
had existed before the war. Freedman's was the first and last attempt at national black
banking. Table 2 reflects the extensive reach of this institution and its appeal to the
freedman in the South. The magnitude of its failure led to the development of a
fragmented black banking industry, made up of small institutions, and driven by the
needs of community-based markets.
Foundation of HBB Industry 1888-1934
There are two phases of growth in the industry of HBBs. The first began in 1888 with
the founding of both the Savings Bank of the Grand Fountain United Order of True
Reformers in Richmond and the Capital Savings Bank in Washington, D.C. Between
1888-1929 over 130 HBBs were created. Many of these early banks were created by
pooling into savings accounts the dues of fraternal orders and mutual aid societies.
These fraternal insurance orders and burial societies sprang up throughout the South in
the 20 years after the end of the Civil War. The failure of Freedman's Savings Bank
and accompanying loss of $3.2 million dramatized the need for mutual aid societies.
Collectively, freed slaves pooled their resources in local organizations to ensure the
provision of burial services and dependent care for the families of departed members.
This way of founding a new financial institution was called "feeding", since the dues
and assessments of members were automatically fed through their organization's own
depository institution. Underlying each of the fraternal insurance orders and burial
societies was a Negro church or minister. In a 1932 Wharton study of the Negro
insurance industry, W.J. Trent claimed that practically every Negro church had one or
more of these benevolent associations attached to it. Apparently, the ministers
organized them as an "attempt to hedge against illness and death." The Alabama Penny
Table 3
Banks & Benevolent
Societies
1888-1910
Year Depository Religious Order City Founder
1888 Savings Bank of the Grand Fountain Richmond, Rev. W.W. Brown
Grand Fountain United Order of True VA
United Order of True Reformers
Reformers
1896 Nickel Savings Bank People's Insurance Richmond, Rev. Evans Payne
Company VA
1902 Mechanics Savings Knights of Pythias of Richmond, John Mitchell
Bank Virginia VA
1903 St. Luke's Penny Independent Order of Richmond, Maggie L. Walker
Savings Bank St. Luke VA
1909 The Galilean Grand United Order of Hampton,
Fisherman's Bank Galilean Fisherman VA
Savings Bank was founded by a minister; and Maggie L. Walker, president of the St.
Luke's Penny Savings Bank, was also the Grand Worthy Secretary of the Independent
Order of St. Luke. Table 3 lists some of the banks which grew out of such
organizations during this period. The influence of the fraternal insurance orders and
burial societies is evident.
Out of congregations and mutual aid societies, new HBBs sprang up in most African-
American communities throughout the north and south. The 1920s, which was a
particularly strong growth period for the U.S. banking industry, also saw the numbers
of HBBs rise dramatically. The end of World War I replicated the end of the Civil War
to the extent that thousands of Negro soldiers returned with their army wages to save
and invest in their communities. In 1926 a meeting of Negro bankers was held at the
Knights of Pythias Hall in Philadelphia. It was called by Major Richard R. Wright,
president of Philadelphia's Citizens Bank & Trust Company and C.C. Spaulding,
cashier of the Mechanics & Farmers Bank of Durham. This meeting led to the 1927
founding of the National Negro Bankers Association' 0 by 14 original HBB members.
The purpose of this new trade organization, according to its first president, Major
Wright, was "to promote uniformity of action and to obtain the practical benefits to be
derived from personal acquaintance and the discussion of subjects relating to financial
and commercial usage." The NNBA began a long tradition of fostering professional
development and shared learning among the industry of HBBs. As a networking,
lobbyist, and professional trade organization, the NBA helped consult many
communities in the developing of their own HBBs.
The NNBA also helped encourage the academic study of black banking as an industry.
As these early HBBs grew as depositories, they became the vehicles for aggregate
savings across the country. The fraternal orders, lodges, burial societies and other
mutual aid organizations stressed collective savings of Negro wages in order to
compensate for their lack of financial security. As these savings grew, Negroes were
able to invest in their own education and local businesses. Their community
development was equity-driven from the savings base which had been created by the
early HBBs. The political and social development of a national African-American
debate at the turn of the century paralleled the growth of these HBBs. Booker T.
Washington founded Tuskegee Institute on the principles of cleanliness and industrial
education. He argued against the study of the Classics, instead encouraging the
development of more practical skills with which the ex-slaves could continue to
demonstrate their economic utility to society. Washington found many white
philanthropists sympathetic to his call for Negroes to shun classical education and
urbanization in favor of manual and agrarian labor. Many former abolitionists and
newly wealthy capitalists like Andrew Carnegie and John Rockefeller were among
1oLon G. Walls; NBA Today, Fall 1982. National Negro Bankers' Association changed its name to the
National Bankers' Association in 1948. It continues to operate today as a trade organization.
Tuskegee's long-time contributors. With little fanfare, Booker T. Washington, and
what became known as "The Tuskegee Machine", also invested heavily in many
historically black-owned firms in black communities across the country including The
Chicago Defender Newspapers, The New York Age, and the Afro-American Realty
Company. He organized the National Negro Business Club which built chapters in
every historically segregated community to facilitate small business development and
the creation of jobs. At its founding meeting in Boston in 1900, he warned the
businesspeople assembled there that Greek immigrants were taking over the shoe-shine
business because "while Blacks were learning Greek, Greeks were blacking up". In that
year, Washington's autobiography, Up From Slavery, was published. It became his
testimonial to the merits of stressing practical education and industrial training. At the
high end of the market, W.E.B. DuBois of Great Barrington, Massachusetts published
The Souls of Black Folk in 1901. DuBois, who had become the first African-American
to receive a Ph.D from Harvard in 1890, contended that Negroes had the right to aspire
to every level of education and professional attainment that others did. He inherited the
support of many former abolitionists and northern coalitions which had aided Frederick
Douglass and other ex-slaves in presenting their moral-based arguments to the
government and the American public. Though strategies differed, a consistent formula
for improvement of the race emerged. It revolved around education, conservative
Christian-based social values, savings, and re-investment. A culture obsessed with
thriftiness and education developed within these segregated communities of ex-slaves.
The depositories of the religious orders reflect the convergence of the black church
with the market-driven needs for insurance and financial intermediation. Historically
black colleges became the research universities which developed strategies and recorded
progress of the economic growth of these communities. Washington, himself an ex-
slave and graduate of Hampton Institute in Virginia, built Tuskegee Institute brick-by-
brick with the prospective students in Tuskegee Alabama. Then he developed the
Institute into a combination research center, policy institute, and mutual fund for black
households and businesses. Even DuBois, who had received his undergraduate degree
from Fisk University in Nashville, TN, eventually joined the faculty of Atlanta
University and helped increase its credibility as a research facility within segregated
communities11. As DuBois' pulpit, Atlanta University became the rival of Tuskegee in
espousing strategies for economic development. During the Fourth Atlanta University
Conference in 1898 on "The Negro in Business", AU president John Hope spoke words
which embodied the consensus which African-Americans had reached about economic
development.
"The Negro's status has changed considerably since the Civil War, but he is
today to a great extent what he has always been in this country - the laborer, the day
hand, the man who works for wages. The great hiring class is the white people. The
Negro develops the resources, the white man pays him for his services. To be sure
some few Negroes have accumulated a little capital. But the rule has been as I have
stated: the white man had converted and reconverted the Negro's labor and the
Negro's money into capital until we find an immense section of developed country
owned by whited and worked by colored.....The labor prince finds himself losing some
of his old estate. Industrial education and labor unions for Negroes will not change this
condition. They may modify it, but the condition will not be very materially changed.
The white man will meet the Negro on the same ground and work for the same wages.
That much we may as well take for granted, calculate the consequences of it, and strive
by every means to overcome this falling off in our old-time advantages...We must take
in some, if not all, of the wages, turn it into capital, hold it, increase it. This must be
done as a means of employment for the thousands who cannot get work from old
sources. Employment must be had, and this employment will have to come to Negroes
from Negro sources. This phase of the Negro's condition is so easily seen that it needs
no further consideration. Negro capital will have to give opportunity to Negro
workmen who will be crowded out by white competition; and when I say Negro
workmen I would include both sexes..."12
11 DuBois was rejected from Harvard as a Massachusetts boarding school student. After getting a
Bachelor's Degree from Fisk, he was then accepted at Harvard from which he obtained another
undergraduate degree in 1890 and his Ph.D in 1895.
12W.E.B. DuBois, The Negro in Business, The Atlanta University Publications, pp56-59 .
HBBs benefited from the focus on internal savings and investment. Appendix B
contains a record of every HBB, including the savings & loans and building & loans,
which existed in April 1929. Many HBBs and other financial institutions of this period
like the Afro-American Realty Company which was responsible for buying up row
houses in Harlem and renting them out to Negro migrants from the South, had already
disbanded by 1929. Dr. Abram L. Harris performed a study of HBBs which
documented their growth from 1899-1934. Harris' work also proved that these
institutions were overcapitalized and very non-liquid. Table Four shows the
comparative ratios of the group of HBBs and the control group of white banks during
that time. Since banks were almost exclusively funded by deposits, ratios of capital and
cash over total deposits were common measures of capitalization and liquidity
respectively. The relative lack of liquidity of HBBs was significant. Since banks could
also invest proceeds in fixed assets as well as financial assets, they were heavily
involved in real estate lending. The significantly higher Fixed Asset:Capital ratio
reflects the amount of real estate which HBBs actually held on their own books. They
took advantage of the long-term nature of their liabilities in the form of consumer
savings to invest in long-term, high earning assets. The fact that HBBs had an 82%
higher capital ratio than the expected norm for banks then partially
Table 4
Comparative Bank Ratios
1903-1930
Ratio of 1:2 HBB
1 2 Bank Norm HBB Differential
Loans and Discounts Earning Assets 75.0% 85.8% 14.4%
Capital Investment Total Deposits 18.0% 32.9% 82.8%
Total Cash Total Deposits 22.0% 20.1% -8.6%
Fixed Assets Capital Investment 21.0% 72.8% 246.7%
Loans and Discounts Total Deposits 66.0% 82.6% 25.2%
compensated for the lack of liquidity in their high yielding portfolio. All of their loans
were made to local African Americans attempting to either buy real estate or establish
businesses in their target markets. The culture of the mutual aid societies and close-knit
religious communities which spawned these depositories and community banks almost
ensured repayment. Lack of liquidity to cover bank panics and runs by depositors was
the major cause of the HBB failures that did occur during this period. Nevertheless, the
attractiveness of a captive market with a very high savings rate and culture of thriftiness
induced many would be entrepreneurs to create new HBBs.
Many white industrialists and former abolitionists, recently encouraged by the
resiliency and thriftiness of Negroes, sought out opportunities to become involved in
serving this market in the 1920s. The Dunbar National Bank of New York is not
included in Appendix B because it was not owned by African-Americans. It was
established by representatives of the Rockefeller interests to serve the more than
100,000 Negroes then residing in New York City. State regulations had made it
impossible for any Negro group to establish an HBB since the demise of Freedman's.
The creation of Dunbar in 1928 was perceived by the African-American community as
a breakthrough made possible only by the financial influence of the Rockefeller family.
It had a capitalization by year's end of $1.893 million dollars and Negro deposits
totaling $757,440. Dunbar became the first bank not owned by African-Americans to
hire Negroes. It also was the first banking experience with the Federal Reserve System
which had been created in 1913. The bank presented black banking consumers a
depository for their funds; and according to historian, Carter G. Woodson, it presented
the black banking industry with an opportunity to acquire more sophisticated
management techniques:
"To say the least, these opportunities[jobs at Dunbar] are valuable in that they
afford an experience for these employees to learn the banking business from a most
dependable source. As they gain experience and become informed along banking lines,
they branch out elsewhere for themselves."' 13
Within twelve months of its founding, however, Dunbar and the nation's banking
system were thrown into crisis by the great depression of the global economy. Of those
88 institutions in Appendix B, only the top eight institutions on Appendix A survived
the Depression. Maggie L. Walker survived it too, and she brought two banks through
it with her. Through her involvement with the St. Luke's Penny Savings Bank, she
became America's first female bank founder and/or president. Just before the
Depression she engineered mergers by St. Luke's with both the Commercial Bank and
Trust and the Second Street Bank of Richmond. The mergers created the Consolidated
Bank & Trust Company of Richmond which she presided over until her death in 1935.
Today, Consolidated is the 3rd largest HBB with over $145 million dollars in assets.
Growth of HBB Industry, 1962-1979
In 1962 there were 10 HBBs. By 1979 there were 52. This growth was characterized by
the spread of black nationalism and economic self-help programs. The initiatives
differed from the mutual aid societies in that they were led by community activists and
professional businessmen, not necessarily religious leaders. These movements were
concentrated in the northern urban communities which were developing parallel to the
segregated black communities of the South. Whereas, southern HBBs were the products
of legalized segregation, these new banks were products of de facto segregation. The
new northern HBBs closely mirrored the objectives and organization of the older,
southern institutions. The promise of these HBBs from the sixties was that the northern
ghetto could finance its own economic development if it had its own bank to pool their
resources, organize their capital, and lend it back in the community. To fulfill this
13Lindsay, p199.
promise, racially segregated urban communities throughout the country began creating
HBBs like Freedom National Bank in New York, Seaway National Bank of Chicago,
the First Independence Bank of Detroit, Gateway National Bank of St. Louis, City
National Bank of Newark, NJ and the American State Banks of Tulsa and Portland.
However, implicit in this idealistic view was the assumption that HBBs would still be
able to be the agents of equity formulation that they had been prior to the depression.
However, banking regulations had restricted many of the powers which HBBs
previously had to hold real assets in their portfolio. In the case of consumer defaults on
real estate mortgages in particular, banks now had to dispose of these assets quickly.
Historically HBBs and early 20th century black depositories were able to work in
tandem with real estate companies like the Afro-American Realty Company to buy up
stretches of real estate and hold them on the balance sheets of the depositories until
southern migrants were found to buy or rent them. More importantly, however, the
HBB's traditional, stable depositor base of small savers slowly began to erode. This
was caused by a myriad of factors including the over reliance on civil rights during this
period, and the effects of higher consumption rates throughout America in the post-war
period.
During the 1960s a debate raged within the historically segregated communities about
whether to call the goal of their civil rights movement "integration" or "desegregation".
By any name, economically it implied breaking up and splintering a captive market for
the HBBs. Figure 1 displays the internal workings of the segregated capital market
which developed during the Civil Rights period. Through gradual capital accumulation,
early HBBs allowed a professional class to be created within these historically
segregated communities. E. Franklin Frazier's publishing of The Black Bourgeoise in
1950 called attention to a well-developed merchant class of African-Americans which
had developed in these communities. The effect on the HBB industry of the civil rights
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movements was the flight of many of this most mobile segment of their market to the
suburbs. In many cases, because non-minority banks still discriminated against blacks,
these households still patronized the HBBs for their credit needs. However their
depository and transactional services were met by other institutions. The flight also left
these communities with a less stable, more transient consumer base which began to see
its employment and job creation drop consistently. Though HBBs created during this
period were very well-received by their segregated market and relatively successful
initially, there were structural flaws in place which were beginning to place them at a
competitive disadvantage.
In response to the flight of the middle class and the growing instability of their
depositor base, HBBs during this period joined the march on Washington. Many
programs were created to help HBBs fund themselves from government deposits at the
state and federal level. This was consistent with the consensus that the government
should be a partner in the economic development of historically segregated
communities. This was the most important distinction between early HBBs and those in
the post-war period. It led to an over-reliance on institutional funding and less on the
depositor base of local consumers. Andrew Brimmer was the first to recognize the high
percentage of government deposits in a comparative study of HBBs in 1971. In it he
concluded that, "black banks as a group appear to possess very little potential as
instruments of urban economic development." 14 Appendix D contains an aggregated
year-end balance sheet for HBBs as of December 31, 1974. However, the aggregation
only includes data from the 30 HBBs that had been in existence prior to 1971 in order
to account for effects of the learning curve. It shows that government deposits had
become responsible for almost 20% of the funding of HBBs. In addition, the industry
14Andrew Brimmer; "The Black Banks: An Assessment of Performance and Prospects.", Journal of
Finance, May 1971, p.4 0 1.
was now investing over 34% of its funds in government securities, while their loan-to-
assets ratio was down to 43% from the pre-depression average of 82%. By the 1970s,
the aggregated balance sheet of the HBB industry had gone from being extremely
illiquid to being dominated by liquid assets. In a 1977 article on capital formation by
minorities, Professor William Bradford gave the following reasons for the new liquidity
in the asset and liability mix of the nation's HBBs:
1) They hold government securities because federal regulations require that most
government deposit funds be invested in this type of asset;
2) Since rapid asset and deposit growth have not been matched by bank capital
growth, black banks must avoid risky assets if they wish to maintain adequate
capital in light of the risks associated with their portfolio of earning assets
(reinforced by the capital adequacy requirements of regulatory authorities);
3) Extreme deposit instability forces the banks to hold highly liquid assets that
easily can be converted into cash for meeting large, sudden withdrawals by
depositors;
4) Black bankers have difficulties in finding reasonably secure outlets for their
funds in the black community. 15
Though the relative merits of these causes have been the subject of subsequent study,
the condition of deposit instability has resulted in the retreat of HBBs from retail
consumer banking. Brimmer's study concluded that HBBs were financing the federal
deficit at a higher rate than the average non-minority bank. Since HBBs were buying
more government securities than the value of their government deposits, then they
became de facto agents of capital flight by investing the savings of their captive
depositor base outside of their historically segregated communities. This was in stark
contrast to the pre-depression HBBs which appeared to hold few stocks and bonds.
15William D. Bradford, "Methods of Capital Formation in the Black Economy"; Capital Formation,
Challenge for the Third Century, University of Michigan, 1976, p. 9 3 .
Harris had reported about the early HBBs that their "high ratio of loans and discounts
to earning assets can be attributed to the fairly general absence of government and other
good securities in the portfolio of these banks."1 6 It was also particularly troubling for
the community activists and analysts who had hoped HBBs from the civil rights
movement would become agents of economic development in their local communities.
Consolidation of HBBs 1980-Present
Of the 42 HBBs created between 1962-1979, only 16 remain. Many of those ghetto
banks of the 1960s failed due to the sweeping changes in the banking industry and their
target markets during the decade of the '80s. Though the total number of HBBs fell
during this period from 52 to 38, there were some new banks which were incorporated.
The growth came from acquisitions of non-minority banks and identification of niche
opportunities. There were also the re-incorporation of at-risk HBBs. In 1982, the
Boston Bank of Commerce was incorporated in a rescue attempt of the failed Unity
Bank & Trust which had been serving that market. Ron Homer, then a Vice-President
at Freedom National Bank in New York, left that institution to head up the new bank in
Boston. Eleven years later the Bank of Commerce has grown from $12.3 million in
assets to over $74 million. Simultaneously, Freedom National Bank embarked upon a
decade of uncertainty marked by management in-fighting, speculative investments and
an unusually high percentage of inside deals which ended in its being closed by the
Office of the Comptroller of Currency in 1991. Economist Andrew Brimmer argued in
a 1991 issue of Black Enterprise magazine that Freedom National was a "stray"
institution with loan and management practices outside the accepted boundaries of
credit analysis, and that it was not representative of HBBs. Nonetheless, the failure of
Freedom, which again left New York City without an HBB, epitomized the pitfalls of
16 Harris; p.59
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the go-go '80s. 17 All was not lost during this period. In fact, some other HBBs were
saved like Unity in Boston. Successful rescue efforts were led by African-American
banking professionals at the First Tuskegee Bank and the New Atlantic Bank which
were retrieved from bankruptcy. Toward the end of the 1980s, even HBBs began
participating in merger mania in search of economies and synergies to compensate for a
broadening relative disadvantage. A group of minority bankers in Chicago bought the
Drexel National Bank in 1989 and later attached it to the Independence Bank of
Chicago under the new Indecorp, Inc. bank holding company.
The NBA, as a trade organization, continued to expand its Minority Banking Programs
through which government agencies and Fortune 500 companies provide commitments
of stable liabilities. Appendix D contains a 1991 advertisement for Indecorp, Inc.
soliciting new deposits. Though the ad was placed in a black professional publication,
the text reveals that the targeted market segment now includes large corporations.
Given the growth and success of the corporate minority banking program, it can be
assumed that an even smaller percentage of their funding now comes from the savings
and investments of their historically segregated markets. In this respect, the decade of
the 1980s was also significant because of the continued abandonment of retail and
consumer banking by HBBs.
Today's HBB Industry-Summary Statistics
The 38 HBBs have over $2 billion dollars in assets with more than $800 million dollars
of loans mostly in racially segregated communities 18. Table 5 compares some of the
summary statistics between today's HBB industry and the snapshot of the industry taken
in 1974. From a base of $598 million, the HBBs' asset size has grown over 240% in
17Black Enterprise Magazine, June 1991. P.170.
18 All current bank data from 1991 year-end Federal Reserve Call Reports.
Table 5
Comparative Aggregate HBB Statistics
1991 1974 % Change
Number of Banks 38 30 26.7%
(in $ '000s)
Total Assets 2,040,207 598,198 241.1%
Total Deposits 1,838,624 530,627 246.5%
Net Loans and Leases 824,261 257,766 219.8%
Consumer Loans 93,598 47,231 98.2%
Cash and Due from Banks 207,026 59,110 250.2%
U.S. Treas. & Govt Securities 630,222 206,272 205.5%
Total Liquid Assets 1,124,861 311,622 261.0%
Total Equity Capital 145,796 40,223 262.5%
Capital Ratio 7.10% 6.72% 5.60%
Loan/Assets 40.4% 43.1% -6.24%
Consumer Loans/Assets 4.6% 7.9% -41.9%
Govt Securities/Assets 30.9% 34.5% -10.4%
Deposits/Assets 90.1% 88.7% 1.60%
Liquidity Ratio 55.1% 52.1% 5.84%
that period. Perhaps in response to eventual criticism of their heavy government
holdings in the 1970s, the banks have reduced their percentage of these securities.
However their holdings of liquid assets has actually grown faster
than their deposits or their assets. The liquidity ratio of the industry has increased
5.84% by holding higher percentages of cash and other short-term securities; while the
capital ratio has also improved 5.60%. The banks have retreated from lending which is
reflected in the 6.24% drop in the loan-to-asset ratio. More significant is
the 41% decline in consumer loans as a percentage of assets. If matching duration of
assets with very unstable retail deposit liabilities is the dominant factor driving high
liquidity, then the liquidity ratio would only have needed to increase enough to cover
the 1.6% increase in the industry's exposure to deposits.
Table 6
Historically Black-Owned Banks
1991 Ranking
by asset size
Assets
Name Location Founded in '000s
1 Independence Bank Chicago, IL 1964 $178,379
2 Seaway National Bank Chicago, IL 1965 170,689
3 Industrial Bank Washington, D.C. 1934 165,062
4 Consolidated Bank & Trust Richmond, VA 1903 143,646
5 Drexel National Bank Chicago, IL 1989 120,699
Asset Size
The largest HBB in 1992 was the Independence Bank of Chicago which had $178.38
million dollars in assets. In fact Table Six shows that three of the top five largest HBBs
are in Chicago. The recently formed Indecorp, consisting of both Independence and
Drexel makes up the largest black-owned financial institution in the country with
almost $300 million in assets 19. The complete ranking of HBBs by asset size is found
on Appendix E.
Table 7
Historically Black-Owned Banks
1991 Ranking
by profitability
Net Income
Name Location in $'000s R.O.E.
1 Independence Bank Chicago, IL 2,003 23.4%
2 United Bank & Trust New Orleans, LA 356 21.5%
3 Unity National Bank Houston, TX 126 19.9%
4 Liberty Bank & Trust Co. New Orleans, LA 374 17.6%
5 Seaway National Bank Chicago, IL 2,220 17.4%
19Two historically black S&Ls are larger than any HBBs. Both Carver Federal Savings of New York and
Independence Federal Savings of Washington, D.C. have well over $200 million in assets each.
Profitability
Independence is also the most profitable HBB when measuring by return-on-total
equity. Independence's ROE of 23.4% was significantly higher than general banking
averages for 1991. As a whole, 26 of the 38 HBBs were profitable in 1991. The
complete ranking by profitability is in Appendix F. The top five presented here in
Table Seven excludes the Founders National Bank of Los Angeles, which had an ROE
of 19.4%, because it was acquired in 1991 by minority entrepreneurs from the RTC.
However, its performance, as well as a glance at the complete rankings imply that asset
size is somewhat of contributing factor to profitability.
Table 8
Historically Black-Owned Banks
1991 Ranking
by solvency
Return on Capital
Name Location Assets Ratio
1 First Southern Bank Lithonia, GA 0.8% 20.7%
2 First State Bank Danville, VA 1.2% 20.4%
3 American State Bank Portland, OR 0.6% 16.3%
4 Emerald City Bank Seattle, WA -9.7% 12.0%
5 United National Bank Fayetteville, NC 0.4% 11.7%
Solvency
Several studies have been conducted which prove that capital adequacy is a good
indicator of solvency, but a poor indicator of profitability. The top five HBBs in terms
of their capital ratio underscore that point. First Southern Bank has the highest capital
ratio and an above average return-on-assets(ROA). However, an analysis of the
complete ranking in Appendix G reveals that two of the bottom five HBBs with capital
ratios below 4% earned the same 0.6% ROA that #3, the American State Bank of
Portland did.
Lessons Learned
HBB failures in major urban markets like New York and Boston have underscored the
vulnerability of these institutions. Bank failures among HBBs however, have been less
widespread than within the broader banking industry more generally. Between 1988
and 1991 over 560 banks failed nationwide. The takeover of failed S&Ls by African-
American led management teams helped increase the number of HBBs over that period
from 35 to 38. Still, it is significant that most HBBs have developed in the absence of
competition. There are only two markets in which two or more HBBs have competed
for more than five years: Chicago and New Orleans. There we find five of the seven
most profitable institutions in the industry. As a result, HBBs have suffered
disproportionately from the de-regulation of the banking industry and the increased
competition from both banks and non-banks which it has unleashed. Unlike firms in
some other historically black industries like publishing and hair care, HBBs were ill-
prepared for competition. Moreover, the increase of new entrants into historically
segregated communities coincided in the 1980s with the retreat of HBBs from consumer
banking. Even real estate lending, which Appendix D shows was 23.0% of HBB assets
in 1974, has only grown 1.8%, while consumer lending by the industry has been
practically cut in half. Major market banks and other non-bank financial institutions
have entered the market to fill the credit gap, particularly in the area of home
mortgages but not the riskier small business lending which creates jobs. Meanwhile,
non-bank competitors like convenience stores and check-cashing retailers have provided
these households with liquidity by selling low-cost transactional services. Turn of the
century HBBs would not have been as susceptible to these competitive threats because
they were closer to their customers. However, as public sector and major corporate
deposits began contributing a greater percentage of liabilities to these banks, the
industry began focusing their products and services in that direction. One major
challenge facing HBBs is how to continue to raise funds outside of their historically
protected markets, while becoming more responsive and competitive in them. An
assessment of what is necessary for the industry to meet this challenge, recognizes the
value of the HBBs' attempts to service a broadening market segment. To accomplish
their objectives of acquiring more stable, long-term liabilities and keeping them over
the long-run, however, HBBs must do more than solicit sympathetic depositors; they
must functionally bridge the service, product, and efficiency gaps that exist between
banks that have developed in the absence of competition and larger, diversified
financial services organizations.
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Market Challenge
Commercial banks serve businesses and households by providing financial
intermediation services between users and the money markets. Banking has also been
very heavily regulated by the government since the depression and global banking
collapse of the 1930s. Driven by the volume of transactions, the business has also been
very labor intensive. In the last two decades however, the integration of several
technological advances has changed banking and many other information intensive
industries from being labor intensive to being capital intensive. Most small banks
(including the entire HBB industry), though they did not participate in this evolution,
were inevitably swept up by the revolution. Information technology(IT) became the
driving force behind what the late economist Arthur Burns, described as the three major
trends of the banking industry in the 1980s: globalization, de-regulation, and
securitization. 20
Modern U.S. Money Market & Banking Analysis
In addition to commercial banks, the other participants in the money market are:
1) central banks; 2) nonfinancial businesses; 3) non-bank financial institutions; and 4)
individual consumers or households. On a daily basis excess funds are lent and
demanded funds are borrowed by agents based upon available information which drives
the equilibrium price (interest rate) in the money market. Like any internal market,
information about prices, transaction costs, and information search costs have
contributed to the relative efficiency of the domestic money market at any given time.
The time required to transport information and currency, itself, contributes to the costs
of borrowing or lending in the money market. This contributed to the costs of banking.
In addition, government regulation by states and the federal government also increases
the costs of participating in the money market for businesses and households. In
20Arthur F. Bums, The OnGoing Revolution in American Banking; American Enterprise Institute, 1988,
p.25.
response to bank failures of the 1930s, the federal government applied regulations
designed to protect depositors by suppressing competition, restraining the ability of
bank management to make unilateral business decisions, and calling for periodic bank
examinations. These priorities led to the prohibition against interstate branching,
ceilings on the interest rates banks could offer depositors, and exclusion of certain
risky assets from commercial bank portfolios. In fulfilling the roles of financial
intermediaries, however, commercial banks continued to develop as brokers who
shared the risk with the central banks of making money markets work in a specific
country and across borders. Yet the layers of regulation at state and federal levels
conspired to permit most HBBs to exist in historically segregated markets in the
absence of competition.
1970 was a watershed year in signaling both the onrush of technological applications in
banking and the impending deregulation of the industry. In that year ceilings were first
removed by the Federal Reserve on negotiable certificates of deposits (CDs). By 1973
when all industrialized nations migrated from a fixed to a floating foreign exchange rate
system, all interest rate ceilings on domestic deposits had been lifted. This allowed
commercial banks to compete for deposits by offering higher interest rates instead of
better toasters. Also in 1970 the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS)
was activated to facilitate the speedy transfer of international funds. It sped up the
development of the Eurodollar market and made participation in global capital markets
more efficient. Securitization began with the federal government's mortgage pass-
through program in the 1970s. Banks quickly took advantage of growing Eurodollar
market to begin issuing Eurodollar obligations to raise money in multiple currencies.
Once the capability to participate more efficiently in international markets was
developed at lower cost and lower risk to home depositors, the regulations against
global capital market participation by commercial banks were quickly removed. In this
regard, the application of technological advances in the 1970s contributed directly to
deregulation, globalization, and securitization by facilitating the discovery of new
financial innovations. Though this has been a geography-neutral, industrywide
phenomenon, the effect on the segment of HBBs has been to further isolate them and
their historically segregated target markets from participation in the broader capital
markets.
HBB Summary Statistics
Call report data was collected from the Federal Reserve and obtained for the calendar
year 1991. The reports contain the financial results of every commercial bank in the
U.S. By controlling for asset size and age of institution, this analysis of the data affords
a credible presentation of the comparative operating performance of HBBs, all
minority-owned banks(MBs), and all non-minority banks(NMBs) 21. The four pages of
Appendix H show sample tables which were developed for each of the thirty-eight (38)
HBBs. This particular presentation of the data allows one to compare the operating
performance of the United National Bank of Fayetteville, North Carolina with that of
the average HBB in its control group, the average minority-owned bank, and the
average non-minority bank. The control group is defined by commercial banks with
assets between $25-50 million which have been in existence for over three years. Note
that at the bottom of the Income Statement it indicates that there are six other HBBs in
this control group, 23 MBs and 2918 NMBs.
2 1Federal Reserve compiles annual operating data from commercial banks by racial composition of
owners. HBBs are defined as having at least 51% ownership by African-Americans. In addition to 38
HBBs, 1991 records also include 63 banks owned by women or other racial minorities. These 63 will
continue to be referred to as OMBs or MBs in this study, while the majority control group of banks will
be referred to as NMBs.
Table 9
Summary Statistics
for Minority-Owned
Banks
HBBs MBs NMBs HBB/NMB MB/NMB
Number of Banks 38 101 11,808 0.32% 0.86%
Employees 1,638 6,111 1,461,948 0.11% 0.42%
Staff per Bank 43 61 124 34.8% 48.9%
Employees Per
Million in Assets 0.80 0.60 0.43 186.8% 138.8%
(in $ MMs)
Total Assets 2,040 10,248 3,401,789 0.06% 0.30%
Total Deposits 1,839 9,150 2,662,732 0.07% 0.34%
Loans & Leases 824 5,700 1,980,765 0.04% 0.29%
Total Equity Capital 146 710 229,888 0.06% 0.31%
Net Income 7 54 18,189 0.04% 0.29%
Capital Ratio 7.10% 6.92% 6.76% 105.1% 102.5%
Loan/Assets 40.4% 55.6% 58.2% 69.4% 95.5%
Deposits/Assets 90.1% 89.3% 78.3% 115.1% 114.1%
Liquidity Ratio 55.1% 38.0% 33.3% 165.3% 113.9%
Return On Equity 5.06% 7.55% 7.91% 64.0% 95.4%
Return On Assets 0.36% 0.52% 0.53% 67.7% 97.7%
Table 9 displays the comparative summary statistics for all HBBs, MBs, and NMBs in
the aggregate. It illustrates that the 38 HBBs represent only 1/3 of a percent of the total
number of commercial banks reporting to the Federal Reserve. The MB totals are
inclusive of the HBB numbers: meaning that there are 63 other MBs which are not
51% owned by African-Americans. The capital ratio of HBBs is higher than the other
groups, but capital is a better indicator of solvency than profitability or efficiency. In
fact, the Finance Department at Virginia State University recently published a report
which proved that thinly-capitalized MBs were more profitable than well-capitalized
ones. In it, Sadie R. Gregory contends that some MBs are in the ironic position of
"having the ability to successfully maintain a profitable operation, while failing to
achieve federally mandated standards of capital adequacy." 22 HBBs which fall in that
category are Unity National Bank in Houston and Liberty Bank and Trust in New
Orleans. In Appendix F, both are among the top five most profitable HBBs in terms of
ROE, while each has a capital ratio of less than 4%. City National and even
Independence of Chicago, the most profitable HBB, are in comparable situations. Both
have ROAs above even the NMB average, while maintaining capital ratios of 5.0% or
less. Both the ROE and ROA figures show that the HBBs are even less profitable than
other MBs. 23 The other significant summary statistics are the liquidity and loan ratios.
They show that this trend of HBBs is unique. Such a high percentage of liquid, low-
yielding assets contributes to their lower profitability. In addition, the HBB average of
"Employees per Million in Assets" is almost double that of NMBs, implying some
combination of high overhead costs, lack of economies and some operating
inefficiencies. By analyzing the comparative performances among control groups of
banks the same size and age, this study identifies that HBBs are experiencing structural
cost disadvantages, regardless of size, which are common to banks serving these
historically segregated markets.
Operating Inefficiencies
Appendices I-L contain the averages for the four control groups of HBBs, compared to
comparable groups of MBs and NMBs. 24 Included among this data is the 1991
operating performance of only the 34 HBBs which were at least 3 years old at the time.
22Sadie R. Gregory. "Capital Adequacy and Performance: Effects of the 198-1991 Financial Crisis on
Minority Owned Commercial Banks and Thrifts"; Virginia State University, School of Business, 1993,
p. 1 .
23The first minority owned bank was the Cathay Bank of Los Angeles, organized by Asian-Americans in
1962.
24Groups analyzed by asset size in $ millions of assets. Appendix 1:50-300; Appendix J:25-50;
Appendix K: 10-25: Appendix L:Under 10. HBBs excluded due to bank maturity are: First Southern
Bank; New Atlantic Bank; First Tuskegee Bank; and Founders National Bank.
The HBBs are generally more competitive in terms of their net interest margin, the
spread between what their assets earn and what their funding costs. In fact, in most
cases, HBBs, as the lender of last resort in their markets, charge more for loans and
pay less for deposits. Comparing the "Avg Int. on Lns & Leases/Lns & Leases" and
the "Interest Expense/Total Assets" items bears this out. This, in and of itself,
represents a risk premium which is exacted by the market on these borrowers because
of a lack of bank competition. However, most all of the margins are eaten away by the
significantly higher costs incurred in SEB and ONIE.
Table 10
Comparative Operating Ratios
Net Int. ROA Avg. Loan ONIE SEB ServChgs ONII
Margin Int. Rates Assets Assets Deposits ONIE
HBBs 4.3% 0.36% 11.53% 2.69% 2.35% 1.56% 18.52%
NMBs 3.6% 0.53% 10.70% 2.08% 1.55% 0.58% 65.85%
OMBs 4.1% 0.56% 10.89% 2.16% 1.81% 0.66% 35.45%
MBs 4.1% 0.52% 10.98% 2.26% 1.92% 0.82% 31.45%
The above chart shows that the aggregate return on assets(ROA) for HBBs is 0.36% for
1991, even though the industry's net interest margin on $2.03 billion in assets was
4.3%. During the same period, all the NMBs averaged an ROA of 0.53% with a
significantly lower net interest margin of 3.6%. Other MB (excluding HBBs results)
indicate that the HBBs' performance drags down that of all MBs. HBBs' ratio of
salaries-to-total assets is over 50% higher than that of NMBs and still 30% higher than
that of OMBs. In addition, the ratio of service charges-to-total deposit volume is 170%
of that of NMBs and 136% of OMBs. These disparities are much more significant than
the higher average loan rates charged by HBBs. From them one can conclude that
transaction costs like service charges on deposits contribute more to loss of consumer
business than the interest rate effect caused by the risk premium. The final column of
this chart compares Other Non-Interest Income (ONII) as a percentage of ONIE. This
is viewed as a measure of the efficiency of off-balance sheet investments. It is observed
again, that even after controlling for size and age of banks, that NMBs generate over
3.5 times the return on non-interest expenses that HBBs achieve. Exhibits 1-10 attached
to this text graphically illustrate that this phenomenon of structural cost disadvantages
holds true for all four control groups of bank comparisons. 25 This discrepancy is
driving the relative profitability of NMBs even though HBBs enjoy a 20% higher net
interest margin on average.
Officials from First Tuskegee Bank in Tuskegee Alabama offered to partially explain
the differentials. Vice-President James Sills points out that in addition to the
maintenance of branches and grounds, telephone bills and other fixed costs common to
all banks, that Other Non-Interest Expense (ONIE) also includes items which reflect the
additional risk of doing business in distressed communities. Higher insurance premiums
and supplemental charges for outlays such as security and training were identified as
sources of disparity. Many HBBs responded to the higher costs of servicing their
depositors, who maintain smaller and more volatile accounts, by levying absorbitant
fees and service charges. Exhibit 8 shows that these charges were often two and three
times the average charges of NMBs. HBBs also applied strict policies against cashing
25Exhibits 1-10 are on pps 93-102
checks for customers who did not maintain accounts or amounts in their accounts
sufficient to cover those checks. These fees and policies, though required by the
regulated market in which HBBs existed, served to increase transaction costs and lower
capital market efficiency by raising the cost to savers of funding the bank's short term
liabilities. It created a push effect driving depositors away from the HBB industry. In
effect, the cost structure of HBBs and then banking de-regulation combined to create an
environment in which low cost providers of basic transactional services were enticed to
enter these markets where HBBs had held de facto monopolies.
Parallel Market Assumptions
The information asymmetries and other barriers which continue to exist between these
parallel capital markets contribute to the consistently different operating performances
of commercial banks in both money markets. By analyzing these call reports, collecting
current annual reports, and from observing consumer behavior in the target market, the
underlying assumptions were substantiated enough to form the basis of this thesis.
Underlying Assumption #1:
Capital markets in historically segregated communities are imperfect and function
relatively poorly.
The definition of a capital market is a system which allows for the efficient transfer of
capital between would-be lenders and borrowers. It is important to note the distinction
between perfect markets and efficient markets. Efficient markets are not necessarily
perfect. According to MIT finance professor, Jean-Luc Vila, a perfect capital market is
distinguished by the following characteristics:
a. It is frictionless. There are no transaction costs, taxes, or constraining
regulations.
___
b. Perfect competition exists in both product and capital markets. All
agents are price takers.
c. It is informationally efficient, meaning that information is costlessly
and simultaneously available to all agents.
d. And all agents are rational expected utility maximizers. 26
Based on this interpretation, perfect capital markets are both allocationallly and
operationally efficient. They are also almost impossible to find. Most market theorists
accept that perfect markets exist only in theory, however they concede that the global
capital market is probably the closest approximation. What makes this possible is the
speed with which information about prices are diffused to all agents in the market. This
levels the playing field and makes it more difficult to obtain arbitrage profits as a result
of information asymmetries. Herein lies the definition of efficient markets. Efficient
market theorists like Eugene Fama claim that market efficiency is the difference
between price and expected value. Consequently, academicians argue that money
market imperfections make borrowing more costly and inconvenient for agents. The
data definitely bears this out for the households and firms in historically segregated
markets. Table 10 and all subsequent data reveal that HBBs consistently charge higher
rates for loans than the NMB average. In addition, the rates paid for deposits are
consistently lower. One sign of an imperfect market is significantly different prices for
the same product. Another is the disturbingly higher "Service Charges on Deposit
Acct" activity that is constant throughout the data. However, researchers warn that
well-functioning capital markets cannot be disproved by the identification of
imperfections 27. Since all markets are assumed to be imperfect, though, one can only
compare their functionality in relative terms. Therefore, we make the assumption that
26Jean-Luc Vila; "Principles of Finance Theory-Class Notes"; M.I.T. Sloan School of Management,
1991.
27Brealey & Myers; Principles of Corporate Finance; 1991, p. 4 12 .
the capital market to which households and firms in these markets have access is not
nearly the approximation to a perfect market that the global capital market is. Since the
higher interest rates may reflect the market's perception of a higher risk of lending in
this market, it might be possible that market efficiency exists in an imperfect capital
market. Nonetheless, the lack of buying power of the households and firms combined
with the sluggishness with which interest rates in the market respond to new
information is enough to conclude that the captive capital market allocates resources
less efficiently than the global one.
Underlying Assumption #2:
2. Historically high transaction costs have driven many households away from HBBs
as traditional sources of financial intermediation.
According to Bruce Gamble, past Executive Director of the National Bankers
Association, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) in Washington, D.C. recently
performed a study analyzing why some Americans don't bank at all. Gamble, now
Staff Director and Counsel for the House Small Business Subcommittee on Minority
Enterprise, Finance and Urban Development claims that though mentioning the case of
rural, isolated households, the study focused on inner-city communities with
commercial banking alternatives. The study identified non-bank competitors like check-
cashing retailers, pawn shops, and other non-financial businesses which provided
financial services to inner city residents. These vendors provide check cashing services,
sell money orders, and lottery tickets. The federal government is observing this
phenomenon because of the potential impacts on various initiatives like Enterprise
Zones and Community Development Banks. It is unclear whether these depositors leave
HBBs because of the lower interest rates paid on their deposits or because of the higher
service charges. What is clear is that these new entrants have responded to a need
which HBBs have migrated away from: efficient transactional services to facilitate
household payment of accounts.
Some HBBs in urban areas have responded like the major market institutions: by
avoiding those depositors and seeking more stable, long-term liabilities for funding.
The necessity to hold reserves against deposits makes it more costly for them,
especially given the low average balances, the large number of transactions, and the
instability of the accounts. Some have sought to discourage retail and consumer
banking. The high prices for depository transactions achieve this objective. They are
reflected in the HBB operating data in the unusually large Salary & Employee Benefits
(SEB) and Other Non-Interest Expense (ONIE) items. By utilizing non-bank
competitors, households in these markets obtain convenience, liquidity, and more
efficient payment of their accounts without paying surcharges for the bank overhead of
sustaining branches, paying FDIC premiums, and satisfying reserve requirements.
Underlying Assumption #3:
3. Lowering costs of value-added services will recapture depositors needed to increase
supply of capital required for meeting system's credit needs.
Like in the broader markets, commercial banking regulations have historically created
bureaucracy and hidden costs which are passed on to consumers. The capital strength of
most major market banks has been so strained that only non-bank competitors like
AT&T, Fidelity, and GE Capital have fully been able to take advantage of de-
regulation. This situation has been exacerbated for the industry of HBBs. Like most
small banks, they were caught even more off guard by deregulation. They have lost
significant market share to non-bank competitors like check-cashing retailers who have
even begun issuing rapid-refund, short-term loans secured by future tax refunds. In a
partial response to their own non-bank competitors, major market banks like Baybanks
and Citibank recently started offering mutual funds and other products offered by other
firms as a way of retaining and recapturing depositors who have strayed. They are
trying to lower the cost of saving and investing to individuals by making the stock and
bond markets more seamlessly accessible to their traditional depositors. Some of the
more consumer-oriented major market banks like Baybanks and Citibank also regard
the retail, non-bank competitors in historically segregated communities as threats to
their franchises in certain markets. Nonetheless, the HBB depositor base in distressed
communities has remained largely ignored.
It is assumed that HBBs could experience a reversal of this 1980s trend if they can
effectively lower their cost of transactional services to recapture lost depositors. They
need product and service innovations comparable to what is transpiring at the major
market banks. Leveraging IT has enabled financial institutions to increase service and
convenience to consumers while gathering information about their investments more
quickly. This is the only way HBBs will be able to get the customers back and
effectively manage the risk and instability of the additional liabilities.
Effects of Size
It should be clear that most of the current problems facing HBBs are common to most
small banks. The lack of economies prevented them from taking advantage of recent
technological advancements to lower their transaction costs. Consequently, they were
not able to take advantage of the 3 major trends in banking in the 1980s: globalization,
de-regulation, and securitization. Neither did they have the scale required to justify
expansive investments in financial innovation. Yet HBBs and other institutions which
serve distressed communities have faced additional competitive pressures which go
beyond the limitations of size. The additional risk of the depositor base is transferred to
the community bank's balance sheet. In fact, the Bank Enterprise Act (BEA) of 1992
defines distressed communities as geographical areas in which the population is
described by two of the following characteristics: 1) low incomes; 2) high poverty
rates; or 3) high unemployment 28. This risk to commercial banks of providing financial
intermediation in this type of market is reflected in much smaller average balances,
many more transactions, a generally more volatile liability mix, and higher servicing
and transaction costs. In addition, many HBBs cite the additional need for consumer
education and explanation of financial services in their markets as reasons why they
require more employees and training to service their market. On the income statement,
this is reflected in the average HBB's higher salaries & employee benefits allocations.
Some bankers at HBBs argue that the lack of economies is reflected in the above
average allocations for ONIE. Yet this is not a viable claim since the disaggregated
data's comparison groups control for size of institution. It also controls for length of
existence so that the effects of the learning curve are negated, as well. For example,
the three HBBs (Commonwealth National Bank of Mobile, AL; Community Bank of
Nebraska, Omaha; and Emerald City Bank of Seattle WA) which have under $10
million in assets all lost money in 1991 whereas the average NMB of that size earned,
on average, over $350,000 more per bank. Exhibits 6 & 7 illustrate that even among
banks this size, the HBBs each spent significantly more than the NMB averages for
SEB and ONIE. If the lack of economies alone does not account for all of the
disparities, then management expertise should be looked at also. The First Tuskegee
Bank of Alabama, though originally founded in 1894, is compared with a control group
of under 3-year old banks. It was recently bought out of bankruptcy and rescued by a
group of African-American bankers from Delaware, led by Mr. James Wright. A
similar effort on behalf of the Atlantic Bank brought Mr. Hilary Holloway from his
post at the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank down to Norfolk to run the new bank.
28Walter W. Eubanks and Pauline H. Smale, "Community Development Banking", Congressional
Research Service Issue Brief; March 1993, p7 .
Both New Atlantic and First Tuskegee are already outperforming the NMB averages in
their control groups. Their years of larger market, commercial banking experience are
not generally available to institutions of this size.
Non-Bank Competition
Non-bank competitors could have just tracked the above-average volume of postal
money order business in distressed communities to justify opening check cashing retail
stores in those markets. By cashing checks and selling money orders, they serve the
transaction and liquidity needs of the neglected, volatile depositors who were creating
problems for banks. This combination of services simulates a demand deposit account
without any loss of liquidity or principal. Appendix M contains a price list from Boston
CheckCashers. The percentages which households pay for check-cashing reflect a deep
liquidity premium which they are willing to pay. This allows them to charge only $0.59
for money orders and processing utility bills which are labor intensive services. Major
commercial banks in the Boston market charge $5.00 for money orders and even the
local HBB, the Boston Bank of Commerce(BBOC), charges $2.00. Appendix N
includes a schedule of charges from the BBOC. The intensity of surcharges and
minimum deposits underscores their desire to lock-in stable liabilities. Since 1982 they
have closed a branch in the historically segregated community of Boston while opening
another one downtown. The benefit of their strategy has been to increase their source
of stable funding from major corporate depositors with which they could invest in more
mortgage and commercial real estate assets in their target communities. In this regard,
BBOC has been an source of capital inflows for the real estate market in its historically
segregated market. However, BBOC is very typical of HBBs in their abandonment of
the retail banking consumer in these markets. Appendix I shows that the larger HBBs
did much less than half the consumer lending that NMBs did. The 3.8% of assets
invested in loans to consumers is down from 7.9% of assets invested by a group of
thirty mature HBBs in 1974 shown on Appendix C. The result in Boston has been the
growth of Boston Check-Cashers' retail presence throughout the historically segregated
communities in this market.
Bank Competition
Banking regulations like reserve requirements and deposit insurance premiums conspire
to maintain barriers to small banks from potentially entering these markets given the
high costs of providing full banking services to these depositors. Although deregulation
has allowed small banks to offer higher interest rates to compete for deposits, it also
increased the potential returns to banks for upgrading and integrating systems. In this
way, advances in information technology reinforced the effects of deregulation by
creating an environment in which IT-driven financial innovations would become the
new axis of competition. IT developments permitted much faster processing of
transactions and transmission of information. The instantaneous spread of information
globally about potential investment opportunities reduced the cost of arranging the best
terms on which financial transactions could be consummated. IT allowed formerly
separate and sovereign money markets around the world to be integrated into one.
However, HBBs and their target markets have yet to participate in these integrated
global capital markets. The growing capital intensity of banking has polarized the
industry into the major market banks which can sustain the technology upgrades which
drive innovations and the smaller, community banks which are positioned to deliver
personalized and niche services.
And ironically, the CRA and other banking regulations which require banks to provide
credit in communities in which they solicit deposits keep large, NMBs from targeting
these historically segregated markets aggressively. Although they have the economies
of scale necessary to absorb the higher marginal service costs and higher deposit
I
volatility, they do not want to be forced to lend there. It is generally felt that they could
avoid taking on the additional credit risk inherent in serving the credit needs of these
distressed communities directly. Some banks like Baybanks emphasize transactional
services over consumer credit by extending X-Press 24 convenience banking to
residents of historically segregated markets. Other major financial institutions like Fleet
Norstar of R.I. have extended credit into these markets through dummy corporations or
surrogates. In these cases, the possible bad publicity from clearly charging different
prices for the same credit products is balanced against the tempting opportunity to exact
a risk premium from a neglected segment of the market 29. In fact, racism is much less
of a factor than it was in originally creating segregation and parallel markets.
Applying Porter's Five Forces
Table 9 contains the summary statistics for the industry of HBBs and other comparison
groups of banks. The industry is enjoying a moderate ROE of 5.1%, but it is severely
underperforming based upon its relative ROA. It clearly is not generating excess
returns. Harvard Business School Professor, Michael Porter's analytical framework for
understanding industries assumes that five forces drive the intensity of competition
within an industry. These five forces are:
1) Entrants: The threat of new entrants
2) Substitutes: The threat of substitute products or services
3) Suppliers: The bargaining power of suppliers
4) Buyers: The bargaining power of buyers
5) Competitors: Rivalry among existing firms30
29Derrick Z. Jackson, "The Arrogance of the Bankers"; The Boston Globe, December 29, 1989.
30Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors; 1980.
According to Porter, increased intensity in any of these categories will increase
competition and/or lower returns to the firms in the industry. The following analysis
evaluates the prospects for excess returns from the HBB industry in this context. Based
upon Porter's definitions, one would conclude that this industry has prospects for low-
to-moderate returns for the following reasons:
1) Moderate-to-High threat of new entrants
2) Low threat of substitutes
3) Low bargaining power of suppliers
4) Moderate-to-High bargaining power of buyers
5) Low rivalry among existing firms
However, the Porter framework also implies that prospects are higher for returns in the
historically segregated markets than in any other. The removal of barriers-to-entry
which resulted from de-regulation has empowered consumers and contributed to current
prospects for low returns. However the bargaining power of consumers in HBBs' target
markets is significantly less because of their lack of buying power and information
symmetry about prices. In addition, the threat of substitutes is much lower in
historically segregated communities because the consumer market there is so risk
averse. They would not feel comfortable without a federally insured account, so the
threat of entry from non-bank competitors is much less. Conversely, it is relatively
easy for Fidelity and other near banks to offer uninsured demand-deposit against which
investors/depositor can write checks. And finally, there is practically no rivalry among
firms in the historically segregated markets. And as has been noticed, in the two
markets where more than one HBB exists, all firms enjoy superior returns. The top five
HBBs in Chicago and New Orleans averaged 19.9% ROE and 1.08% ROA, or more
than double the NMB averages. Therefore, based on the empirical data and relative to
the broader banking industry, there appears to be more potential for higher returns in
the historically segregated banking markets. If so, there would be economic value in
cooperative economic ventures between HBBs and major market banks.
Parallel Market Summary
Today parallel markets and the risk premium exists due to age-old interpretations of the
theory of efficient markets: Market inefficiencies cause mispricing of assets which will
lead firms quickly to enter the market to exploit the opportunity until the opportunity is
gone. Therefore, the current inefficiency of the capital and money markets in
America's distressed communities was created in part by government regulation which
suppressed banking competition and a combination of racial, legal, and socio-economic
segregation. Though much-maligned institutions like Fleet and the Dime Savings Bank
of New York would argue that they were simply picking up the $50 bills off the
sidewalk, as any efficient market theorist would, it has become clear that some of their
business practices have more in common with northern carpetbaggers during
Reconstruction.
Market Challenge
There is a legitimate business opportunity in these markets and a profitable way to
pursue it. This situation presents ethical commercial banks and diversified financial
institutions which have the economies and can manage or hedge the marginal risk with
an opportunity to add value to the economies and internal capital markets of historically
segregated communities. By renting their excess of IT capacity and extending their
product lines into HBB branches, they can become the toll road through which the HBB
depositor base enjoys access to a more efficient and truly global capital market.
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Many HBBs have consistently high Net Interest Income (Exhibit 4), but suffer from
high overhead and labor costs which eat away at their above average interest margins.
Exhibits 5 & 6 highlight this problem. The operating objective of NuBank is to create
buying power for the HBB industry so that it can negotiate more cost effective access to
technology-driven global capital markets. Specifically, NuBank seeks to rent the cost
structure and technology platform of larger, major market financial institutions on
behalf of its affiliated HBBs, so they can reduce their "Salaries & Employee
Benefits"(SEB) and "Other Non-Interest Expense"(ONIE) expenditures. In this way,
HBBs would be free to reduce their "Service Charges on Deposits", thereby becoming
more cost competitive with non-bank, retail alternatives, while encouraging more
savings and investment in their market. Essentially, NuBank would be able to add value
to the industry of HBBs, to diversified financial institutions seeking distribution
channels in these historically segregated markets, and to the banking customers in those
communities seeking more efficient access to financial intermediation. A well-
coordinated operating plan is required to ensure that NuBank adequately services each
of these constituent parties. In order to provide the intended functionality, NuBank
must become a source of the type of financial innovation which has recently been more
typical of non-bank new entrants in historically segregated markets than of HBBs.
Operations Plan
The operations of NuBank will at different times resemble that of a wholesaler, a
consulting firm, and a mutual fund for HBB banks.
NuBank as Wholesaler
Acting as a distributor, NuBank would create buying power for the HBBs in negotiating
with financial institutions. NuBank would be renting the HBB branches as a distribution
channel to larger, major market banks and near banks which seek to penetrate
historically segregated markets. As a distributor, NuBank will leverage their
investments in product development, so that each small HBB can re-invest the
overhead. The benefit to HBBs of allowing other financial institutions to sell their
brand of financial products and services through HBB branches is that it increases value
to HBB customers at no cost to the HBB, while freeing up HBB manhours and other
costs that may have been charged to internal development of the same product. The
savings could be more or less depending on how much control over the distribution,
service, and follow-up on the products that the financial institutions are interested in
owning. Many banks and financial institutions target small banks for data processing
and transactional services. In addition to these lines, Baybanks is unique in New
England in its desire to maintain complete control and ownership of branded Baybanks
financial products which they are attempting to market through local branches of other
banks. In fact, they have targeted a market of over 338 small institutions for
correspondent banking services. There are three such products which NuBank would
pursue immediately for acquisition and distribution.
ATM Services
Less than half of the HBBs offer ATM(Automated Teller Machines) services. ATMs
provide liquidity to consumers at lower costs to the banks per transaction. NuBank
could broker a deal based upon projections of aggregated HBB transaction volume
which is much better than that in which any of the HBBs with ATMs are currently
participating. The relationship would be developed with a large bank or service bureau
which processes electronic funds transactions. NuBank could offer HBB affiliates a
NubiCard which would be connected to an international network. For liquidity, HBB
customers will pay a premium as is evidenced by the deep discounts they pay for check
cashing services (See Appendix M). In the HBB industry ATM proliferation could lead
to the rare case in which headcount per branch is actually reduced, if it leads to a
migration of transaction volume from in-branch traffic to electronic transactions. For
HBBs already with ATMs, the NuBank deal could help consolidate data centers and
spread the costs of service bureaus. The most appropriate possible vendors would
include Baybank, Citibank, and EDS.
Private Label Credit Card
Less than one-third of HBBs offer credit cards. NuBank could extend a private label
MasterCard or Visa to each of its affiliated HBBs. It is about as essential a product
offering as ATMs for competing in their increasingly competitive target markets. As
evidence, Boston Check Cashers recently began distributing MasterCard applications in
its retail check cashing outlets in the South End, Roxbury, Dorchester, and Mattapan
sections of Boston. The product is a Western Union debit card issued by Associates
National Bank of Delaware. NuBank could develop a relationship with a more
sophisticated credit card issuer to manage the portfolio. In this way, NuBank would be
brokering the extension of external credit into the target markets of each participating
HBB. A vendor like Citibank's Card Products Group could use its Premier Pricing
product to effectively manage the risk of this new credit card portfolio. Premier allows
Citibank cardholders to effectively price themselves by earning lower annual percentage
rates as they create a successful payment history. The credit card vendor would earn
interest income on which it could pay fees to NuBank. Annual fees of HBB cardholders
could be split between NuBank and the affiliated HBB. The product, in conjunction
with ATM service, would provide the HBB with a cost-effective opportunity to reverse
their retreat from consumer banking, and increase their market share of retail customers
in their market. Prospective vendors of this product would be Citibank, GE Capital,
General Motors, and AT&T Universal.
Asset-Backed Securitization
In particular, NuBank would initially seek out mortgage-backed security participation
for the HBB industry. Only two HBBs are presently participating in the secondary
mortgage market. HBB mortgages in the aggregate represent a $506 million market and
for all minority-owned banks (MBs) it is $3.3 billion31 . Creation of an NuBank pass-
through program would provide HBBs with more liquidity and available capital with
which to increase commercial and consumer lending in their communities. For the two
banks which are already in this business, participation in the NuBank program would
allow them to redirect those human resources and capture a savings.
NuBank as Consulting Firm
Every financial product to be distributed contains a high information content. Some are
particularly information-intensive. These leveraged-product deals cannot even be
negotiated without creation of an information technology infrastructure at the holding
company level through which data from HBBs can be aggregated, analyzed, and
redistributed. NuBank will have a cadre of banking technologists to broker deals and
integrate the information systems of each affiliated HBB. NuBank would be the
compatibility bridge between financial vendors and local HBBs. This consulting and
information technology component of the holding company is essential if it is to
facilitate the delivery of third party products and services into the branches of HBBs.
Given the creation of an IT bridge at NuBank, the holding company should optimize
the platform by offering proprietary consulting and financial services. NuBank could
offer management consulting and process re-engineering services to its affiliated HBBs.
As a bank holding company, it could also offer some financial and non financial credit
3 1Boston Bank of Commerce is most active. BBOC President, Ron Homer, is out in front of HBB
industry in pioneering secondary mortgage market.
and service enhancing services like credit counseling, tax planning and preparation, and
real estate appraisals through HBB branches. These value-added services would
contribute to reducing the information asymmetry which exists among financial service
consumers in historically segregated communities. In addition, the services would
increase the most desirable type of retail foot traffic in the branches: customers
shopping for a premium service, as opposed to price- and time-conscious liquidity
buyers. These types of NuBank services will be very instrumental in repositioning
HBBs as the one-stop, financial services center of their communities. That historical
position has been threatened recently by the proliferation of check-cashing retailers
which optimize their retail space and increase traffic by selling money orders, lottery
tickets and even processing Rapid-Refund tax loans. Revenues from NuBank's services
can be split between NuBank and affiliated HBBs based upon the distribution of
marginal labor costs.
NuBank as a Mutual Fund for Banks
NuBank would develop affiliations with HBBs by negotiating co-marketing and/or
revenue-sharing agreements with them. In addition, HBBs could either buy equity in
NuBank, sell equity to NuBank, or give NuBank an equity option. As a less risky
issuer with more scale, NuBank could access capital markets to raise funds cheaper
than any HBB. Some of these HBBs are certain to have significant upside earnings and
growth potential once they get their costs in line with industry averages. NuBank would
be uniquely positioned to know which HBB management teams are most likely to
succeed in this regard. Holding equity in a portfolio of HBBs which is diversified by
geography, size, and asset allocation would ensure NuBank's cost of capital advantages
over any of the individual HBBs or OMBs. Figure 2(next page) hypothesizes that
NuBank would buy 5 % of an HBB in Chicago for earnings, 15 % of one in Durham for
growth, while requiring the unprofitable HBB in Seattle to swap equity options in
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exchange for affiliation. HBBs which viewed NuBank as a source of low cost funds
would be required to implement the holding company's schedule of operations
management and process re-design recommendations developed specifically for that
bank.
Economic Value-Added
The economic value which NuBank would add immediately is significant and far-
reaching. Figure 3(next page) reveals that the source of this value is NuBank's strategic
positioning between the HBB markets and the global capital markets. By brokering and
facilitating mutual access to firms in both markets, NuBank is providing a valuable
service which is not currently being offered in any aggregated or integrated form.
Affiliated HBBs, their customers, financial service providers, and NuBank investors
would all realize significant economic returns from the successful implementation of
NuBank's operating plan:
To Affiliated HBBs
1. Greater profitability due to the lower salary and non-interest expenses from
consolidation, sharing technology and collapsing back office systems.
IF NuBank can help HBBs reduce their overhead to the levels experienced by
other minority-owned banks(MBs), the participating banks would experience an
increase in their net income of 295 %. The HBB average ratio of "Salary &
Employee Benefits":Assets is 2.35% ; and their ratio of "Other Non-Interest
Expenses": Assets is 2.69%. The corresponding ratios for MBs are 1.81% and
2.16% respectively. For non-minority-owned banks it is 1.55% and 2.08%. The
potential earnings boost if the entire HBB industry just got its cost in line with
the other MBs would be $21.8 million.
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2. Leveraged bank products & services help attract capital back to system by
lowering transaction costs and other disincentives to depositors/investors.
Branded financial products from major financial institutions would help broaden
the comfort zone that consumers have regarding patronizing their local HBB.
Reduction of overhead will also allow HBBs to reduce their "Service Charges
on Deposits". In 1991 HBBs earned 1.56% of their total deposits in fee
revenue. Even if they reduce that by 40% to 0.94% of total deposits(still a 42%
premium over the other MBs), the industry would still experience a net income
boost of over 155% from the corresponding reduction of overhead. A 40%
reduction in revenue from service charges would reduce the $21.8 million
earnings gain from consolidation to $11.5 million. This should result in a
corresponding return of depositors in those markets to the HBBs, which will
increase the asset size and earning potential of affiliated HBBs.
3. Management assistance and consulting to improve operating efficiency.
Over the course of delivering leveraged financial products, NuBank
technologists will assist affiliate HBBs in the design and implementation of
processes which institutionalize the IT-driven efficiency gains. This will allow
NuBank to become a vehicle for service and process innovations which ensure
that affiliated HBBs do not use IT simply to automate outdated processes.
4. Access to global capital markets lowers average cost of capital.
For HBBs in need of capitalization, NuBank could be a cheaper source of funds
than those within the direct reach of small HBBs. They lack economies of scale
to issue equity publicly; and they are too risky to borrow extensively. Given the
consistently lower rates they have been able to offer depositors in their
communities, debt markets have been a relatively expensive source of funding.
However, the cost of the cheaper liabilities has been a relatively instable
depositor base which has created liquidity problems for the banks. That
depositor base will not stabilize until HBB offer higher rates with lower service
charges. As interest rates trend up, private placements by NuBank will become
an increasingly attractive source of funds.
To Target Market (Consumers in Distressed Communities)
1. Better transactional services at lower cost
Reduction of service charges will return to consumers millions of dollars for
consumption or investment, while ATMs and other IT-driven enhancements
increase liquidity.
2. Lower credit costs due to lower cost of banks'funds and increased capital
market efficiency.
Increased operating efficiency of HBBs, and more competition among both in-
market retailers and external financial service providers will result in lowering
of historical premiums charged to consumers in historically segregated markets
for both borrowing and lending.
3. Supply of internal capital organized to meet community's internal demand.
Return of depositors to HBBs increases their funding and supply of capital with
which to meet captive loan demand. Reduction of regulations and surcharges
have the effect of increasing market efficiency, and making more capital
available for lending. If rates increase and deposits stabilize, then HBBs will
also enjoy additional benefit of reducing liquidity ratio and their high percentage
of low-earning assets like T-Bills and other short-term securities. For
I
customers, the private label credit card will also help to increase liquidity in the
consumer lending segments of historically segregated markets.
To Financial Service Providers
1. Organization of new opportunity to access captive market of historically
segregated banking consumers.
Coordinating the branches of HBBs into a chain of retail outlets for financial
services delivers new distribution power to commercial bank partners and other
vendors.
2. Diversification of risk by emphasis on fee-generating businesses.
Credit card product is the only direct extension of external credit into the
historically segregated markets being proposed currently by NuBank. This limits
the credit risk which financial institutions are exposed to. The asset-backed
securities are fully expected to be divested and sold off to investors by the
participating financial service providers. The lack of credit and interest rate risk
provides firms with more stable business opportunities with NuBank, which are
easily quantified and managed.
To NuBank Investors
1. High quality stream of cash flows from fee-dominated businesses
Since NuBank's revenue is not dominated by interest income, investors' returns
are less subject to the risk of interest rate fluctuations. Commercial bank
partners or other buyers of NuBank debt would be attracted by the relative
stability of dividends and coupon payments.
I
2. Upside equity participation in affiliated HBBs with most growth potential.
Equity speculation is possible with the affiliated HBBs. Some of the firms will
clearly be able to increase their operating margins and market value as a result
of affiliation with NuBank. By carefully injecting equity into the most
promising HBB situations, NuBank can allow its investors to share in the
growth of certain HBBs in their markets.
Revenue & Growth Opportunities
The aggregate assets of HBBs have grown at an average rate of 14.2% annually. Their
earnings growth has not kept pace, however, due to the 5.84% aggregate increase in
the industry's liquidity ratio over the period. The 4.9% total asset growth experienced
from 1990-91 reflects the recent consolidations and slower growth within the industry.
However, NuBank would be able to grow in any of three ways: 1)from market
expansion by accessing new captive markets of affiliated HBBs; 2) from product line
expansion by offering additional proprietary and third party product and service
innovations; and 3) from acquisitions, by making the right equity investments in
growing affiliates.
Market Expansion
NuBank can begin its operations once it has developed any type of reciprocal
relationships with any HBB. It should expand into the captive market of HBBs and then
other minority-owned banks on a case-by-case basis. After saturating the $10.25 billion
dollar minority banking industry, NuBank would have two distinct opportunities to
pursue even greater market growth. It could take advantage of the synergies between
HBBs and all small-cap banks to begin marketing services to small, non-minority
owned banks. It could also offer services to banks in Africa and Central America. The
largest minority-owned banks in America are the hispanic-owned International Bank of
Commerce in Laredo, TX and the Cathay Pacific Bank of Los Angeles, CA; both of
which enjoy a significant amount of foreign deposits from Latin America and Asia
respectively. With the establishment of an international banking facility, NuBank would
be well positioned to grow globally. By developing distribution arrangements with
institutions like the First National Bank of Barbados and the United Bank of Nigeria,
NuBank could effectively quadruple the size of its distribution territory.
Product Line Expansion
The third party products which NuBank plans to initially negotiate all share the
potential to make an immediate positive impact on the target market. Other possible
third party products include branded mutual funds, cash management accounts, and
discount brokerage services. NuBank could also expand its line of proprietary products
and services to include items like financial planning, trusts & estate management, and
private banking.
Acquisitions
Currently there are 101 minority-owned banks; and the number is growing due to the
rapid increase in the population of Latinos. The acquisition strategy will parallel the
strategy of expanding into other captive bank markets. Equity call options can be
negotiated on any affiliated bank which seeks to carry either NuBank brokered products
or proprietary services. If the ensuing product diversification and efficiency gains result
in improving that bank's performance, then NuBank can exercise its call and participate
in the returns. This could be applied to international expansion as well. The acquisition
business could develop into a separate fund for HBBs or third world banking which
raises funds earmarked for these types of equity placements.
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The model of a holding company to act as an agent of managed consolidation and
financial innovation in the black banking industry is the most appropriate response to
the challenge of extending capital market efficiency and financial intermediation in
distressed communities. To be an effective conduit of information, technology, and
capital between the local HBBs, major financial institutions, and global capital markets,
NuBank will need to simultaneously develop and maintain reciprocal relationships with
agents in each of these segments. The organizational model is designed to facilitate
implementation of the operating plan, and ensure initial buy-in of the HBB industry and
commercial bank partners.
Organizational Chart
Figure 4(next page) displays the proposed organizational chart for NuBank. It is
distinguished by a major IT subsidiary called NuBank Systems, Inc., and two distinct
operating units. Each of the operating units, "Acquisitions" and "Leveraged Products",
as well as the IT subsidiary will function as separate profit centers for the holding
company. The model was derived from thorough analysis and appropriation of two
organizations: Baybanks, Inc., a bank holding company; and United Asset
Management Co., a holding company for small asset management firms. As a result,
the NuBank organization will model its IT-driven banking operations after Baybanks
and its acquisition business and affiliate company relations after United Asset
Management.
Baybanks, Inc. Model
Baybanks is a Massachusetts bank holding company which was founded in 1913 as Old
Colony Associates 32. It founders, which included some Bank of Boston officers, sought
32Bill Crozier, The History of Baybanks; Address to the Newcomen Society, 1988.
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to take advantage of the demand in the market for bank securities. They established a
company for the specific purpose of buying interest in small banks around
Massachusetts. Many of the banks were very independent, family-owned businesses
which serviced specific regions of the state's banking market. Although the company
had always sought to create economies among its banks, it initially met resistance from
some owners to any efforts at consolidation. Throughout its early history, the Bay State
Corporation33 was content to buy equity in these banks, advise them independently on
their operations, and participate in the growth of their equity. By the 1970s, however,
the Bay State Computer Corp., a subsidiary of the holding company, had become the
data center for all of the banks which the company held interests in. The name was
changed to Baybanks in 1974 and applied to each of the regional banks, while the data
center became Baybanks Systems, Inc.(BBSI). After having been the agent of
consolidation for this group of banks, the IT subsidiary of Baybanks began to expand
its role in supporting the territorial operations of the regional banks. Joe Lynch, BBSI
Vice-President of Correspondent Banking argues that field offices of regional banks are
used to gather information about the customer and perform community relations. The
bulk of the operations and control of the banking businesses have slowly migrated from
each individual bank to the IT subsidiary.
BBSI currently dominates the organizational structure of Baybanks, Inc. Its activities
include the following: Computer Operations; Electronic Fund Transfer Operations;
Item Processing Operations' Data Security; Quality Assurance; Technical Support;
Systems Planning & Development; Correspondent Banking; Advertising & Marketing;
and Human Resources. NuBank Systems, Inc. would be modeled after BBSI in terms
of the high status and centrality of its functions. It will provide IT services both
internally to the Acquisition and Leveraged Product units, and externally to affiliated
33Ibid. Name changed to Bay State Corporation in 1946.
banks. To accomplish this, NBSI will have to build an IT infrastructure and delivery
system, the excess of which it shall rent in the form of back-office processing as well
as information and operations consulting services to firms in the HBB industry.
Consequently, the Baybanks and BBSI model are significant for the following reasons:
1. Use of IT subsidiary as an agent of bank consolidation and brand development.
2. Collapsing of marketing, market research, and operations activities into IT
subsidiary.
3. Targeting markets of small banks for renting excess capacity of IT subsidiary.
United Asset Management (UAM) Model
UAM is a holding company for small, money management firms which was created by
Norton Reamer, then an executive with the Putnam Investment Management
Companies. In 1980, the company started buying 50% interests in money management
firms. It financed the acquisitions with a combination of equity and debt, while
developing revenue sharing agreements with the newly affiliated firms which
guaranteed streams of free cash flows to the holding company. The company had a
successful initial public offering of equity in 1986 to finance additional acquisitions;
and today the company has over thirty affiliated companies which manage more than
$60 billion in assets.
UAM's affiliate companies are characterized by high operating margins and maverick,
often fiercely independent, money managers. In exchange for 50% equity in the
acquired money management firm, UAM receives 50% of the operating revenue. UAM
pays the owners of the affiliate company, who are often comprised of the firm's top
principals or money managers, in a combination of cash and stock in the UAM holding
company. In addition, the UAM revenue-sharing agreement guarantees the affiliates
complete operating control over their small, money management boutiques. UAM
manages no money at all at the holding company level. Their acquisition adds value to
the principals of affiliated companies by discounting future cash flows in order to
provide liquidity to the principals of these firms. UAM also offers some marketing
support. However, in contrast to the Baybanks model, the UAM holding company has
made no substantial attempts to exert any operating influence or consolidation over its
affiliate companies. After being cashed out, principals of the affiliated companies,
which are top-heavy in intangible assets with low overhead, are left to cover the
balance of their operating costs with only 50% of their operating revenue. UAM was
able to generate positive net margins within five years by 1985. Since then they have
experienced steady growth of assets under management, revenue, and profitability.
Table 11
UAM Growth & Profitability
1991 1990 1989 3-Year Avg.
Revenue 33.5% 14.9% 20.8% 23.1%
Assets Under Mgt (AUMs) 37.8% 11.1% 34.5% 27.8%
Return-on-Equity 13.2% 11.8% 10.6% 11.8%
Return-on-Assets 5.5% 4.7% 4.5% 4.9%
Net Margins 10.8% 10.7% 10.4% 10.6%
The above table shows that profitability has increased with the growth of assets under
management. However, analysts have found that growth of affiliate companies slowed
after they were acquired, while increasing acquisitions has dominated the growth of
UAM. 34 The holding company has maintained very high margins by keeping a very
34Fernandez, Jakoniuk, Lai, Rogers & Serbin, "What is UAM?"; MIT Sloan School of Management,
November 25, 1992.
flat organizational structure (In 1992 holding company staff was less than 20) and
focusing on acquisition opportunities. An analysis confirmed that UAM was receiving a
profitable liquidity premium from the selling affiliates for discounting 50% of its cash
flows to its principals. The UAM model is significant for NuBank the following
reasons:
1. Acquisition potential is a better business than operating revenue from affiliates.
2. Assurance of operating control to affiliates is critical to support for acquisitions.
3. Though margins are consistent, their size and the risk of equity growth imply
that organizational structure should be flat initially.
3. Affiliate management might lose proper incentives if they lack enough potential
for upside equity participation.
Management Structure
The management structure of NuBank integrates the appropriate lessons learned from
the successful models of Baybanks and UAM. The structure and organization is
designed to empower the leaders of individual businesses, while providing constituent
groups with direct access to profit-center leadership and a clearly identifiable set of
management incentives.
Office of the CEO
The CEO of NuBank shall be responsible for overall profitability of each of the
operating divisions and execution of the staff functions of the holding company. In this
capacity, the Managing Directors of the Acquisitions business, the Leveraged Product
business, and NBSI will report directly to the CEO. In addition, holding company staff
officers responsible for Finance, Human Resources, and External Affairs will report to
the CEO. Both the Finance and H-R departments will work with the business MDs to
support the operating divisions. In particular, the corporate Chief Financial Officer will
a
be the source of funding for all three businesses and work with division staffs to
establish appropriate profitability hurdles and rates of return for each unit. The CFO
should either be a commercial banker with significant corporate finance experience or
an experienced investment banker with contacts at prominent Wall Street firms. In the
event that the CEO is also President and Chairman of the NuBank Board of Directors,
the CFO should join the CEO and the three operating division heads on the Executive
Committee of the corporation; and the Managing Director of NBSI would also serve as
Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors.
Acquisitions
The Managing Director of Acquisitions will lead a team of merger and acquisition
specialists. They will analyze HBBs and negotiate with their management and
ownership teams for appropriate pricing and size of equity injections. Acquisitions team
will work closely with CFO to identify lowest possible cost of capital for holding
company with which to fund investments in affiliated banks. Research for analysis of
comparative HBB operating performances may be performed in-house or contracted out
based upon relative costs. UAM experience proves, however, that acquisition potential
is significant enough to warrant dedicating NuBank resources to a separate, fully-
operational business unit. The unit will require its own Chief Technology Officer to
assess the IT requirements of the business and coordinate services with NBSI. This
officer will report directly to the group's director in this capacity as liaison to NBSI.
The business' Managing Director should be either a Mergers & Acquisition specialist
or an experienced bank equity analyst. A candidate with investment banking experience
and Wall Street contacts would be preferred.
Leveraged Products
The Managing Director of the Leveraged Products group will report directly to the
CEO and lead a team of marketing and finance professionals. They will be responsible
for identifying marketing opportunities to acquire branded financial products and/or
services from major financial institutions and make them available to consumers in
historically segregated markets through the branches of HBBs. The group will be
responsible for negotiating co-marketing agreements with both segments of financial
service providers like Citibank and GE Capital and the segment of HBBs. In this
regard, the unit should be staffed with experienced marketing and product specialists
from commercial banks, investment banks, and other financial institutions. Though the
unit will negotiate directly with financial service providers, it will work with NBSI
consultants to address retail requirements of HBBs. Since most of the initial products
like ATM/EFTs and private label credit cards are so information-intensive, IT
consultants from NBSI will join group professionals on cross-functional marketing
teams to assess the systems compatibility of vendors with NBSI and affiliate banks.
This assessment will be essential to proper pricing of products with major market
sellers and small bank buyers. The Managing Director should also be a marketing
veteran of a major financial institution.
NuBank Systems, Inc. (NBS1)
In the short-run, NBSI will consist of a Managing Director and a personal staff. He
will contract out for all IT development and support services necessary to build its
primary businesses. NBSI, as an IT subsidiary, will be built out of retained earnings
from NuBank's Acquisitions and Leveraged Product businesses. Eventually NBSI, like
Baybanks System, Inc., will be the control center for the banking operations of
NuBank. It will contain excess capacity of data centers which it shall seek to rent to
affiliate HBBs. The Managing Director will have several work group leaders reporting
to him which represent the various functions which NBSI will fulfill on behalf of
NuBank's other two profit centers and any affiliated banks. The NBSI MD should be a
strategic business planner with major market P&L experience and significant
technological literacy.
Computer Operations
This group will be responsible for the total management and execution of all
information processing. It will work with liaisons from Acquisitions and Leveraged
Products on operations of in-house computing systems which support staff. The group
will also manage the holding company's strategic IT hardware and software assets,
while making the excess available for processing data from affiliated banks. Like BBSI,
the activities of this group will include assessing leveraged product requirements,
technical support, data security, and quality assurance. Revenues will be generated
from outsourcing these services to affiliate banks, as well as from charging appropriate
expenses to Acquisitions and Leveraged Product units. The leader of this group should
be an experienced MIS Director.
Systems Planning & Development
The group should be responsible for all systems application planning, development,
programming, and maintenance for the holding company and its two operating units.
The group will also research systems to consolidate and integrate various information
systems of HBBs and other potential affiliate banks. This group will determine scope of
potential back office synergies with acquisition targets. The group will take the lead in
creating IT compatibility bridges among HBBs, and between NuBank and global capital
market participants. Charges for corporate R&D will be expensed to holding company,
while proprietary applications for either of the operating units would be separately
charged and require unit profitability hurdle justification. Members of this group would
work on cross-functional teams in both the operating units. The leader of this group
should be a software programmer or systems integrator with major market MIS
experience.
Marketing
This group shall serve as the marketing department for the corporation. It will
coordinate activities of NuBank's corporate advertising with an outside agency, while
corporate staff External Affairs Officer oversees public relations work. The group will
dedicate members to work on cross-functional teams in both operating units for which
those units will be charged. In particular, group will negotiate co-marketing agreements
with prospective HBBs to develop affiliation in lieu of any equity participation by
NuBank. Affiliate marketing team will work with Acquisition professionals to evaluate
optimal structure of affiliate relationships with prospective HBBs. Group will also
negotiate with Leveraged Product professionals to determine optimal terms for product
pass-through which would maximize affiliate banks' incentives to sell products through
branches. The group will also have a team responsible for developing and
implementing holding company's proprietary products and services. Since NuBank's
own product line will consist of both financial and non-financial products, staff of
Marketing group should reflect that. Group should also have some input from HBBs
marketing professionals, as well as experienced financial service marketers. Leader of
this group however should be a consumer marketing professional who has either
financial services and/or retail experience. Responsibility of group will be to maximize
the utility of the retail platforms which branches of HBBs represent. To maximize
revenue, they will be able to use leveraged products or develop their own.
HBB Consulting/Relations
NBSI will also include a team of consultants which will also service the affiliates, as
well as perform periodic performance audits of NuBank's operating units. The unit will
provide obligatory affiliate services to HBBs which may fulfill NuBank's requirements
from revenue-sharing or co-marketing agreements. In this regard, professional
consultants from this group will be on cross-functional teams with business units,
marketing and computer operations groups. The group will also be able to market IT
consulting and process re-engineering proprietary services to affiliated and unaffiliated
banks. Consulting services will generally be profit maximizers; or at times they may be
loss-leaders charged to either future acquisitions or co-marketing agreements from
marketing group. The consulting group leader will be an experienced consultant from
the financial institutions practice of a major market management consulting firm.
However, with the exception of a personal staff, the group's leader will be required to
develop a cross-functional teams of consultants internally from professionals in
Computer Operations, Systems Development, and Marketing groups. Revenues from
consulting will be proportionately credited to these other representative groups of
business professionals throughout NBSI.
Incentives
The incentives for management of the holding company will be dominated by
performance bonuses based upon profitability of operating units and groups. Each work
group in NBSI will be market-driven and free to supply internal or external clients with
support services. Division and group bonuses will be shared among all management
professionals and be paid out in a combination of cash and/or stock options. The
incentives for affiliate HBBs will be designed to encourage continued growth and sales
of retail banking products. Like UAM, NuBank will afford rotating Board seats to
principals from affiliate banks to represent their equity interests.
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Thesis Statement
The industry of historically black-owned banks(HBBs) suffers from market
inefficiencies characterized by high transaction costs, unusually high non-interest
expenses, and little financial innovation. This has created a significant market
opportunity for larger commercial and investment banks to gain market share in this
industry by creating fee-related businesses which leverage their economies of scale and
investments in innovations. In partnership with a national black bank holding company,
large and diversified financial institutions can help the affiliated HBBs improve their
operating performance, develop competitive advantages, and make more efficient
capital markets in their target communities.
4
The 38 HBBs, themselves, are underutilized and somewhat hard-to-price assets. There
have been at least 180 HBBs at one time or another. These institutions are similar to
historically black colleges and universities in their unique utility to their customer base.
They traditionally have serviced the very hard to reach. In fact, when either historically
black banks or colleges fail, it is very often the case that a substitute supplier is never
found. Aspiring college students seek lower skilled jobs and would-be savers turn to
non-depository, transactional service providers or even back to the mattress. The early
HBBs were much closer to the customers in their target markets in terms of fulfilling
the financial intermediation needs of households. According to Heinz Riehl and Rita
Rodriguez, households enter the money market for any one or more of the following
reasons:
1. For transaction purposes to make payments for desired articles
2. For precautionary purposes, in case some unforeseen event takes place
3. For speculation purposes, to profit from expected changes in interest rates. 35
HBBs were created in many cases to respond to the second need on this list for mutual
aid. The historically black insurance industry, however, grew parallel to the HBB
industry and dominates these needs. In this way, the regulatory firewall between the
insurance and banking industries inhibited the growth of large, historically black
financial institutions which could capture synergies and create economies for itself.
Though HBB target consumers rarely have the need to speculate on interest rates, the
first need for transactional services has come to dominate their market. This is also an
area where early HBBs were more responsive to retail consumers in their target
markets, before the banking regulation of the 1930s and then de-regulation of the 1980s
changed the competitive environment on them abruptly.
3 5Riehl and Rodriguez, Foreign Exchange & Money Markets; 1983; p.5
HBB Recommendations
In order to regain market leadership and a position of enhanced retail competitiveness
in their home markets, HBBs should implement the following recommendations in
conjunction with becoming affiliated with NuBank.
Reduce Costs & Overhead by Leveraging Technology
HBBs should get affiliated with NuBank, then take advantage of their IT infrastructure
to reduce headcount and systems maintenance costs. In addition, HBBs should conduct
a general review of Non-Interest expenses to eliminate waste and redundancies while
making these investments more productive. Utilizing NuBank's proprietary services
would be a way of generating more Non-Interest Income, while reducing Non-Interest
expenses.
Eliminate Surcharges and Reduce Transaction Costs to Depositors
This customer base is even less willing to pay premiums and surcharges on deposits and
transactions to HBBs than they are to major market banks which charge less. HBBs
must get price competitive with retailers and non-bank competitors in their
communities. Dramatic re-structuring of charges is necessary to regain consumer
confidence and significant market share of stray depositors. HBBs can recoup some of
the loss service charge revenue from IT-driven, liquidity enhancing products like ATM
access. This volatile customer base will pay a premium for convenience and liquidity,
but not for checks or a simple demand-deposit account.
Encourage Long-Term Savings by Offering Premium Rates on Deposits
Balance new liquidity offerings with offers of high rates on long-term deposits.
Conduct high profile marketing campaigns in community to encourage savings by
advertising how much higher than major market rates HBBs are willing to pay
community residents for their deposits. Offering premiums on only long-term deposits
and CDs will help stabilize deposit base. There is a price (interest rate) at which these
depositors will lend long-term; HBBs need to find it and get there.
NuBank Start-Up Strategy
As demonstrated by the organizational experiences of UAM and Baybanks, Inc., the
First Nubian National Bank will have to carefully negotiate its way between the
industry of HBBs and the broader market of global financial institutions. To do this
effectively, NuBank will have to create and maintain a fairly flat organizational
structure with minimal overhead as UAM has done. In fact, even Baybanks started out
this way. It took over sixty years for what was Old Colony Associates to develop the
subsidiary which became Bay State Computer Corp. and then Baybank Systems, Inc.
Likewise, NuBank will begin as a staff of banking and IT professionals which performs
valuation, marketing, brokering, and consulting services. The holding company will
generate fee income from the profitable execution of these services, as well as inspire
the confidence of market participants on both sides. As NuBank demonstrates its ability
to add value in this market, it will be able to incrementally build the internal IT
infrastructure described earlier within the NBSI subsidiary. Initially, the responsibilities
of the NBSI which are vital to the development of the Acquisition and Leveraged
Product businesses, as well as NuBank's own proprietary offerings will be fulfilled by
a Chief Technology Officer for the holding company and his staff. This officer will
become the Managing Director of the IT subsidiary once the scale and scope of
NuBank's activities justify building those capabilities in-house.
Conclusion
The First Nubian National Bank model in conjunction with the recommendations above
is the most appropriate response to the challenges facing HBBs. It is a private sector
solution which seeks to maximize the advantages these banks have as retail outlets in
delivering branded financial products and services to would-be savers and borrowers in
their home communities.
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APPENDIX A
Historically Black-Owned Banks
1991 Chronological Listing
$2,039,207,000 in total assets
Assets
Name Location in $ '000s Founded
1 First Tuskegee Bank Tuskegee, AL 24,789 1894
2 Consolidated Bank & Trust Richmond, VA 143,646 1903
3 Citizens Savings Bank & Trust Nashville, TN 34,982 1904
4 Mechanic & Farmers Bank Durham, NC 101,477 1908
5 First State Bank Danville, VA 25,834 1919
6 Victory Savings Bank Columbia, SC 15,862 1921
7 Citizens Trust Bank Atlanta, GA 109,911 1921
8 The Carver State Bank Savannah, GA 16,138 1927
9 Industrial Bank of Washington Washington, D.C. 165,062 1934
10 Tri-State Bank of Memphis Memphis, TN 68,301 1946
11 Independence Bank of Chicago Chicago, IL 178,379 1964
12 Gateway National Bank of St. Louis St. Louis, MO 16,487 1965
13 Seaway National Bank of Chicago Chicago, IL 170,689 1965
14 American State Bank Portland OR 11,726 1969
15 American State Bank Tulsa, OK 16,740 1970
16 First Independence Bank of Detroit Detroit, MI 74,485 1970
17 Highland Community Bank Chicago, IL 75,789 1970
18 Greensboro National Bank Greensboro, NC 17,340 1971
19 North Milwaukee State Bank Milwaukee, WI 28,952 1971
20 Liberty Bank & Trust Company New Orleans, LA 57,730 1972
21 City National Bank of New Jersey Newark, NJ 51,324 1973
22 Community Bank of Nebraska Omaha, NE 6,253 1973
23 First Texas Bank Dallas, TX 96,890 1975
24 Commonwealth National Bank Mobile, AL 8,820 1976
25 United National Bank Fayetteville, NC 26,062 1976
26 Community Bank of Lawndale Chicago, IL 33,026 1977
27 Boston Bank of Commerce Boston, MA 74,658 1982
28 The Harbor Bank of Maryland Baltimore, MD 44,898 1982
29 Peoples' National Bank of Commerce Miami, FL 20,570 1982
30 The Douglass Bank Kansas City, KS 26,174 1983
31 Emerald City Bank Seattle, WA 7,318 1988
32 Drexel National Bank Chicago, IL 120,699 1989
33 First Southern Bank Lithonia, GA 20,321 1989
34 New Atlantic Bank Norfolk, VA 18,732 1989
35 Unity National Bank Houston, TX 22,211 1989
36 Omnibank River Rouge, MI 18,350 1990
37 United Bank & Trust New Orleans, LA 27,145 1990
38 Founders National Bank Los Angeles, CA 61,437 1991
APPENDIX B
Directory of Negro Banks,
Alabama
Tuskegee Institute Savings Bank, Tuskegee Institute
District of Columbia
Industrial Savings Bank, Washington
The Prudential Bank, Washington
Union Laborers Savings Bank, Washington
Florida
Progress Savings Bank, Key West
The Ocala Savings Bank, Ocala
Anderson and Company Bankers, Jacksonville
Georgia
Atlanta State Savings Bank, Atlanta
Auburn Savings Corporation Bank, Atlanta
Penny Savings Loan and Investment Co., Augusta
Fidelity Savings Bank, Savannah
Mechanics Investment Company, Savannah
Mechanics Savings Bank, Savannah
Savannah Savings and Real Estate Corp., Savannah
Wage Earners Savings Bank, Savannah
Liberty Savings and Real Estate Corp., Macon
Middle Georgia Savings and Investment Co., Macon
Laborer Savings & Loan Co., Columbus
Citizens Trust Co., Atlanta
Illinois
Binga State Bank, Chicago
Douglass National Bank of Chicago, Chicago
Kentucky
First Standard Bank, Louisville
American Mutual Savings Bank, Louisville
Louisiana
Citizens State Banking Co., New Orleans
Maryland
Hatchett and Lewis Bankers, Baltimore
J. Wendell Thomas Bank, Baltimore
Harry O. Wilson Bank, Baltimore
Wingate and Brown Bankers, Baltimore
Taylor and Jenkins Bankers, Baltimore
Massachusetts
Eureka Cooperative Bank, Boston
South End Cooperative Bank, Boston
Michigan
D.C. Northcross and Co., Bankers, Detroit
Peoples Finance Corp., Detroit
1900-1928
President
R.R. Moton
John W. Lewis
J.R. Hawkins
J.H.W. Howard
F.P. Gadson
C.H. Anderson
J.O. Ross
B.J. Davis
R.S. Williams
E.H. Quo
E.H. Quo
P.E. Perry
W.S. Scott
L.E. Williams
R.E. Hartley
C.H. Douglas
J.L. Scanins
A.M. Wilkins
Jessa Binga
Anthony Overton
Wilson Lovett
W.H. Wright
J.H. Lowery
Truly Hatchett
Gilbert Harris
E.P. Benjamin
D.C. Northcross
A.L. Turner
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Directory of Negro Banks,
Mississippi
Mound Bayou State Bank, Mound Bayou
Delta Penny Savings Bank, Indianola
Missouri
Peoples Finance Corporation, St. Louis
North Carolina
Dime Bank, Kinston
Forsyth Savings and Trust Co., Winston-Salem
Citizens Bank and Trust Co., Winston-Salem
Holloway, Murphy and Co., Kinston
Albemarle Bank, Elizabeth City
Commercial Bank of Wilson, Wilson
Fraternal Bank and Trust Company, Durham
Mechanics and Farmers Bank, Durham
Mechanics and Farmers Bank (branch), Raleigh
Mutual Aid and Banking Co., Newbern
Isaac Smith Trust Co., Newbern
Ohio
Empire Savings and Loan Co., Cleveland
Adelphi Building, Loan and Savings Co., Columbus
Oklahoma
Boley Bank and Trust Co., Boley
First National Bank of Boley
Pennsylvania
Modern State Bank, Pittsburgh
Citizens and Southern Bank and Trust Co., Philadelphia
The Steel City Banking Co., Pittsburgh
Keystone Bank, Philadelphia
Brown and Stevens Banking Co., Philadelphia
South Carolina
Victory Savings Bank, Columbia
Mutual Savings Bank, Charleston
Peoples Federation Bank, Charleston
Workers Enterprise Bank, Bennetsville
Tennessee
Fraternal Savings Bank and Trust Co., Memphis
Solvent Savings Bank and Trust Co., Memphis
Citizens Savings Bank and Trust Co., Nashville
Peoples Savings Bank and Trust Co., Nashville
Texas
Farmers and Citizens Savings Bank, Palestine
Farmers Improvement Bank, Waco
1900-1928
T.S. Morris
J.E. Walker
Chas. E. Herriot
H.E. Dunn
J.S. Hill
J.W. Jones
T.B. Holloway
E.E. Hoffler
S.H. VIck
W.G. Pearson
C.C. Spaulding
C.C. Spaulding
J.P. Stanley
Isaac Smith
H.E. Murrell
D.C. Chandler
J.J. Johnson
J.L. Phillips
R.R. Wright, Sr.
M.S. Hunter
J.C. Asbury
E.C. Brown
C.E. Stevenson
E.E. Edwards
W.H. Johnson
E.J. Sawyer
A.F. Ward
T.H. Hays
H.A. Boyd
J.B. Singleton
E.M. Grigg
R.L. Smith
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Directory of Negro Banks, 1900-1928
Farmers and Mechanics Bank, Tyler W.A. Redwine
Fraternal Bank and Trust Co., Fort Worth Thomas Mason
Workmen's Savings and Loan Co., Galveston Edward Washington
Virginia
Brown Savings Bank, Norfolk E.C. Brown
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., Norfolk W.M. Rich
Crown Savings Bank, Newport News E.C. Brown
Commercial Bank and Trust Co., Richmond J.T. Carter
Gideon Savings Bank, Norfolk
Galiliean Fisherman's Bank, Hampton
Tidewater Bank and Trust Company, Norfolk
Sons and Daughters of Peace, Penny, Nickel and Dime Bank,
Newport News S.A. Howell
Second Street Savings Bank, Richmond John T. Taylor
Peoples Dime Savings Bank and Trust Co., Staunton Samuel Lindsay
Peoples Bank of Petersburg, Petersburg
St. Luke's Penny Savings Bank, Richmond Mrs. Maggie L. Walker
Nickel Savings Bank, Richmond R.F. Taniol
Mechanics Savings Bank, Richmond John Mitchell, Jr.
Community Savings Bank, Portsmouth J.F. Proctor
The Phoenix Bank of Nansemond, Suffolk J.W. Richardson
Continental Savings Bank, Dendron
West Virginia
Mutual Savings and Loan Co., Charleston C.E. Mitchell
APPENDIX C
HBB Summary Balance Sheet 1974
30 Banks (in $'000s)
ASSETS
Cash and due from banks
Government securities
Federal funds sold
Other securities
Total liquid assets
LOANS
Business
Real estate
Consumer
Total Net Loans
Other Assets
TOTAL ASSETS
LIABILITIES & NET WORTH
Non-government deposits
Government deposits
Other liabilities
TOTAL LIABILITIES
Minority interest in consol. subs
Reserves
Net Worth
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH
59,110
206,272
34,777
11,463
9.9%
34.5%
5.8%
1.9%
311,622 52.1%
72,949 12.2%
137,586 23.0%
47,231 7.9%
257,766 43.1%
28,810 4.8%
598,198 100.0%
412,621 69.0%
118,006 19.7%
27,348 4.6%
557,975 93.3%
28 0.0%
3,010 0.5%
37,185 6.2%
598,198 100.0%
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APPENDIX D
Indecorp Ad in Black Enterprise, June 1991
We'd be very happy
to see a few new aces
at our banks!
/V
Your deposits in Independence and Drexel help us do many important
things in your community. As the largest black-owned bank holding company in
America we're proud of our position of leadership in the financial community. But
we're just as proud of our position of leadership in the
neighborhoods and communities we serve.
We formed the g This year we'll offer mortgage, consumer and
black-owned bank holding company commercial loans to many qualified borrowers. We invite
In Aner t th bee&of you to join us in these efforts to build a stronger America
Scommuni lik Y for everyone. Many Fortune 500 companies like Sears,
Avon and Borg-Warner already have.
Contact Lonnie Radcliffe, Vice President at Independence Bank,
(312) 4874700 or Sidney King, Vice President and Director of
Marketing at Drexel National Bank, (312) 225-9200.
Independence Bank of Chicago and Drexel National Bank. Working
together for you.
The financial team of ldecorp, Inc.
Wrkng together foryon
Independence Bank of Chicago
Drexel National Bank
I Indecorp, Inc.
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APPENDIX E
Historically Black-Owned Banks
1991 Ranking
by asset size
Assets
Name Location Founded in '000s
1 Independence Bank of Chicago Chicago, IL 1964 $178,379
2 Seaway National Bank of Chicago Chicago, IL 1965 170,689
3 Industrial Bank of Washington Washington, D.C. 1934 165,062
4 Consolidated Bank & Trust Richmond, VA 1903 143,646
5 Drexel National Bank Chicago, IL 1989 120,699
6 Citizens Trust Bank Atlanta, GA 1921 109,911
7 Mechanic & Farmers Bank Durham, NC 1908 101,477
8 First Texas Bank Dallas, TX 1975 96,890
9 Highland Community Bank Chicago, IL 1970 75,789
10 First Independence Bank of Detroit Detroit, MI 1970 74,485
11 Boston Bank of Commerce Boston, MA 1982 74,658
12 Tri-State Bank. of Memphis Memphis, TN 1946 68,301
13 Founders National Bank Los Angeles, CA 1991 61,437
14 Liberty Bank & Trust Company New Orleans, LA 1972 57,730
15 City National Bank of New Jersey Newark, NJ 1973 51,324
16 The Harbor Bank of Maryland Baltimore, MD 1982 44,898
17 Citizens Savings Bank & Trust Nashville, TN 1904 34,982
18 Community Bank of Lawndale Chicago, IL 1977 33,026
19 North Milwaukee State Bank Milwaukee, WI 1971 28,952
20 United Bank & Trust New Orleans, LA 1990 27,145
21 The Douglass Bank Kansas City, KS 1983 26,174
22 United National Bank Fayetteville, NC 1976 26,062
23 First State Bank Danville, VA 1919 25,834
24 First Tuskegee Bank Tuskegee, AL 1894 24,789
25 Unity National Bank Houston, TX 1989 22,211
26 Peoples' National Bank of Commerce Miami, FL 1982 20,570
27 First Southern Bank Lithonia, GA 1989 20,321
28 New Atlantic Bank Norfolk, VA 1989 18,732
29 Omnibank River Rouge, MI 1990 18,350
30 Greensboro National Bank Greensboro, NC 1971 17,340
31 American State Bank Tulsa, OK 1970 16,740
32 Gateway National Bank of St. Louis St. Louis, MO 1965 16,487
33 The Carver State Bank Savannah, GA 1927 16,138
34 Victory Savings Bank Columbia, SC 1921 15,862
35 American State Bank Portland OR 1969 11,726
36 Commonwealth National Bank Mobile, AL 1976 8,820
37 Emerald City Bank Seattle, WA 1988 7,318
38 Community Bank of Nebraska Omaha, NE 1973 6,253
APPENDIX F
Historically Black-Owned Banks
1991 Ranking
by profitability
Net Income
Name Location in $'000s R.O.E.
1 Independence Bank of Chicago Chicago, IL 2,003 23.4%
2 United Bank & Trust New Orleans, LA 356 21.5%
3 Unity National Bank Houston, TX 126 19.9%
4 Founders National Bank Los Angeles, CA 1,220 19.4%
5 Liberty Bank & Trust Company New Orleans, LA 374 17.6%
6 Seaway National Bank of Chicago Chicago, IL 2,220 17.4%
7 Drexel National Bank Chicago, IL 1,096 15.1%
8 The Carver State Bank Savannah, GA 124 11.8%
9 City National Bank of New Jersey Newark, NJ 235 11.4%
10 Tri-State Bank of Memphis Memphis, TN 727 10.7%
11 Industrial Bank of Washington Washington, D.C. 1,120 10.5%
12 Omnibank River Rouge, MI 124 9.9%
13 First State Bank Danville, VA 504 9.6%
14 Mechanic & Farmers Bank Durham, NC 758 7.3%
15 Highland Community Bank Chicago, IL 374 6.6%
16 First Tuskegee Bank Tuskegee, AL 114 5.4%
17 American State Bank Portland OR 97 5.2%
18 Citizens Trust Bank Atlanta, GA 377 4.3%
19 United National Bank Fayetteville, NC 118 3.9%
20 First Southern Bank Lithonia, GA 152 3.7%
21 The Harbor Bank of Maryland Baltimore, MD 107 2.9%
22 First Texas Bank Dallas, TX 186 2.1%
23 Boston Bank of Commerce Boston, MA 50 1.3%
24 Greensboro National Bank Greensboro, NC 10 0.8%
25 Peoples' National Bank of Commerce Miami, FL 13 0.6%
26 New Atlantic Bank Norfolk, VA 2 0.2%
27 American State Bank Tulsa, OK -22 -1.9%
28 Community Bank of Lawndale Chicago, IL -78 -4.0%
29 North Milwaukee State Bank Milwaukee, WI -113 -4.8%
30 First Independence Bank of Detroit Detroit, MI -464 -14.5%
31 Consolidated Bank & Trust Richmond, VA -976 -18.0%
32 Citizens Savings Bank & Trust Nashville, TN -245 -20.3%
33 Gateway National Bank of St. Louis St. Louis, MO -148 -21.5%
34 Victory Savings Bank Columbia, SC -592 -40.7%
35 Commonwealth National Bank Mobile, AL -215 -80.8%
36 Community Bank of Nebraska Omaha, NE -39 -88.6%
37 The Douglass Bank Kansas City, KS -1,535 -113.0%
38 Emerald City Bank Seattle, WA -781 -130.0%
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APPENDIX G
Historically Black-Owned Banks
1991 Ranking
by solvency
Return on Capital
Name Location Assets Ratio
1 First Southern Bank Lithonia, GA .8% 20.7%
2 First State Bank Danville, VA 1.2% 20.4%
3 American State Bank Portland OR .6% 16.3%
4 Emerald City Bank Seattle, WA -9.7% 12.0%
5 United National Bank Fayetteville, NC .4% 11.7%
6 The Douglass Bank Kansas City, KS -5.4% 10.6%
7 Peoples' National Bank of Commerce Miami, FL .1% 10.5%
8 Tri-State Bank of Memphis Memphis, TN 1.0% 10.3%
9 Mechanic & Farmers Bank Durham, NC .7% 10.3%
10 First Texas Bank Dallas, TX .2% 9.1%
11 First Tuskegee Bank Tuskegee, AL .5% 8.6%
12 The Harbor Bank of Maryland Baltimore, MD .2% 8.3%
13 North Milwaukee State Bank Milwaukee, WI -.4% 8.1%
14 Victory Savings Bank Columbia, SC -3.7% 7.8%
15 Citizens Trust Bank Atlanta, GA .3% 7.7%
16 Seaway National Bank of Chicago Chicago, IL 1.3% 7.5%
17 Omnibank River Rouge, MI .7% 7.2%
18 Greensboro National Bank Greensboro, NC .1% 7.0%
19 Founders National Bank Los Angeles, CA 1.9% 6.9%
20 United Bank & Trust New Orleans, LA 1.3% 6.7%
21 Boston Bank of Commerce Boston, MA .1% 6.7%
22 New Atlantic Bank Norfolk, VA .0% 6.7%
23 American State Bank Tulsa, OK -. 1% 6.7%
24 The Carver State Bank Savannah, GA .8% 6.6%
25 Highland Community Bank Chicago, IL .5% 6.6%
26 Industrial Bank of Washington Washington, D.C. .7% 6.5%
27 Drexel National Bank Chicago, IL .9% 6.1%
28 Community Bank of Lawndale Chicago, IL -.2% 5.9%
29 Independence Bank of Chicago Chicago, IL 1.3% 5.0%
30 City National Bank of New Jersey Newark, NJ .4% 4.5%
31 Gateway National Bank of St. Louis St. Louis, MO -.9% 4.5%
32 First Independence Bank of Detroit Detroit, MI -.6% 4.4%
33 Citizens Savings Bank & Trust Nashville, TN -.9% 3.9%
34 Commonwealth National Bank Mobile, AL -2.4% 3.9%
35 Liberty Bank & Trust Company New Orleans, LA .6% 3.8%
36 Consolidated Bank & Trust Richmond, VA -.9% 3.5%
37 Unity National Bank Houston, TX .6% 3.1%
38 Community Bank of Nebraska Omaha, NE -0.6% 0.6%
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Appendix H
United NB of Fayetteville, NC
Selected Assets and Liabilities
Compared with the Average Minority-Owned Bank
And the Average NonMinority-Owned Bank
Over 3 Years Old with Total Assets of
$25,000,000 to $50,000,000
(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars)
Your Avg. Avg. Avg Non
Bank HBB MinBank MinBank
ASSETS
Cash and Due from Depositories
Total Securities Held
U.S. Treas. & Govt Securities
All Other Securities
Federal Funds Sold, etc.
Loans and Leases, Net
Real Estate
Commercial and Industrial
Consumer
All Other
Less Unern Inc & LN Loss Pro
All Other Assets
TOTAL ASSETS
1,400
2,280
1,351
929
700
20,002
2,357
15,978
2,000
0
333
1,680
v
LIABILITIES
Domestic Deposits, IPC
Deposits of U.S. Government
Deposits of States & Pol Subd
All Other Domestic Deposits
Total Domestic Deposits
Foreign Deposits
Total Deposits
Federal Funds Purchased, etc.
Oth Liabs For Borrowed Money
Notes & Debent Sub To Deps
All Other Liabilities
Total Liabilities
EQUITY CAPITAL
Perpetual Prefer & Common Stk
Surplus
Undiv Profit & Capital Reserve
Cumul Fgn Cur Translation Adj
Total Equity Capital
Total Liabilities and Equity Capital
3,359
7,395
6,248
1,147
3,145
16,316
9,259
4,766
2,461
271
442
1,347
3,027
7,590
6,716
873
3,011
17,421
10,424
4,983
2,167
401
556
1,726
2,494
11,787
9,460
2,327
2,167
18,315
9,435
3,153
3,456
2,757
488
1,520
26,062 31,561 32,777 36,283
21,017 24,577 25,604 29,718
790 1,346 806 55
218 1,649 1,343 2,142
452 375 1,121 429
22,477 27,947 28,876 32,346
0 0 0 0
22,477 27,947 28,876 32,346
0 0 532 227
0 178 304 63
262 59 17 4
282 312 314 366
23,021 28,496 30,045 33,007
2,257 1,232 1,234 587
1,191 1,831 1,531 1,284
-407 -141 -34 1,401
0 0 0 0
3,041 2,922 2,732 3,272
26,062 31,418 32,777 36,283
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Appendix H cont'd
United NB of Fayetteville, NC
Per Cent Distribution of Selected Assets and Liabilities
Compared with the Average Minority-Owned Bank
And the Average NonMinority-Owned Bank
Over 3 Years Old with Total Assets of
ASSETS
Cash and Due from Depositories
Total Securities Held
U.S. Treas. & Govt Securit
All Other Securities
Federal Funds Sold, etc.
Loans and Leases, Net
Real Estate
Commercial and Industrial
Consumer
All Other
Less Unern Inc & LN Loss
All Other Assets
TOTAL ASSETS
LIABILITIES
Domestic Deposits, IPC
Deposits of U.S. Governmo
Deposits of States & Pol S
All Other Domestic Deposi-
Total Domestic Deposits
Foreign Deposits
Total Deposits
Federal Funds Purchased,
Oth Liabs For Borrowed Mi
Notes & Debent Sub To D(
All Other Liabilities
Total Liabilities
EQUITY CAPITAL
Perpetual Prefer & Commo
Surplus
Undiv Profit & Capital Resc
Cumul Fgn Cur Translation
Total Equity Capital
Total Liabilities and Equity Capit
$25,000,000 to $50,000,000
(Amounts in %)
Percent Distribution
Your Avg.
Bank HBB
Per Cent of Total As
5.4 9.5
8.7 24.6
ies 5.2 20.5
3.6 4.1
2.7 10.1
76.7 51.6
9.0 27.3
61.3 16.4
7.7 8.5
0.0 0.9
Prov 1.3 1.5
6.4 4.1
100.0 100.0
Avg
MBK
sets
9
23
20
2
9
53
31
15
6
1
1
5
100
Per Cent of Total Deposits
93.5 87.7 88.7
3.5 5.1 2.8
1.0 5.9 4.7
2.0 1.3 3.9
100.0 100.0 100.0
0.0 0.0 0.0
100.0 100.0 100.0
0.0 0.0 1.8
0.0 0.9 1.0
1.1 0.2 0.1
1.2 1.1 1.0
Total Per Cent of Liabilities
2.3 2.2 3.9
Per Cent of Assets
8.7
4.6
-1.6
0.0
11.7
100.0
4.0
6.3
-0.4
0.0
9.8
100.0
3.8
4.7
-0.1
0.0
8.3
100.0
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.2
.2
.5
.7
.2
.2
.8
.2
.6
.2
.7
.3
.0
Avg
NMB
6.9
32.5
26.1
6.4
6.0
50.5
26.0
8.7
9.5
7.6
1.3
4.2
100.0
91.9
0.2
6.6
1.3
100.0
0.0
100.0
0.7
0.2
0.0
1.1
2.0
1.6
3.5
3.9
0.0
9.0
100.0
.w-
Appendix H cont'd
United NB of Fayetteville, NC
Income And Expenses
Compared with the Average Minority-Owned Bank
And the Average NonMinority-Owned Bank
Over 3 Years Old with Total Assets of
$25,000,000 to $50,000,000
(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars)
Your Avg. Avg. Avg. Non-
Bank HBB Min. Bank Min. Bank
INTEREST INCOME
Int & Fees On Loans & Leases 2,122 1,869 2,089 2,062
Int in Bal with Depository Inst 10 92 72 61
Incm on Federal Funds Sold, etc 80 229 173 124
Int & Divid Incm on Securities 130 559 595 906
Incm/Assets Held: Trading Acct 0 0 1 1
Total Interest Income 2,342 2,749 2,931 3,156
INTEREST EXPENSE
Interest on Deposits 1,056 1,357 1,434 1,689
Expense of Fed Funds Prchsd 0 2 14 10
Interest on Oth Borrowed Money 0 11 23 2
Other Interest Expense 19 5 7 1
Total Interest Expense 1,075 1,375 1,480 1,704
Provisions 95 226 252 135
Service Charges on Deposit Acct 309 323 291 174
Other NonInterest Income 69 82 126 134
Gains on Secur not in Trad Acct 0 9 35 17
Salaries & Employees Benefits 557 734 755 584
Other Noninterest Expense 836 972 995 659
Incm Before Taxes & Extraord Itm 157 -143 -97 398
Applicable Taxes 39 34 51 125
Income Before Extraord Items 118 -177 -148 273
Extraordinary Items, Net 0 0 7 9
Net Income 118 -177 -141 281
Number of Employees 23 24 25 20
Number of Banks 7 23 2,918
Appendix H cont'd
United NB of Fayetteville, NC
Per Cent Distribution of Income And Expenses
Compared with the Average Minority-Owned Bank
And the Average NonMinority-Owned Bank
Over 3 Years Old with Total Assets of
$25,000,000 to $50,000,000
(Amounts in %)
Percent Distribution
Your Avg. Avg. Avg. Non-
Bank HBB Min. Bank Min. Bank
Per Cent of Interest Income
Int And Fees on Loans & Leases 90.6 67.9 71.3 65.3
Int in Bal with Depository Inst 0.4 2.5 2.5 1.9
Incm on Federal Funds Sold, etc 3.4 8.1 5.9 3.9
Int & Divid Incm on Securities 5.6 21.5 20.3 28.7
Incm/Assets Held: Trading Acct 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Interest Income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Per Cent of Interest Expense
Interest on Deposits 98.2 98.5 96.9 99.1
Expense of Fed Funds Prchsd 0.0 0.2 0.9 0.6
Interest on Oth Borrowed Money 0.0 1.0 1.6 0.2
Other Interest Expense 1.8 0.4 0.5 0.1
Total Interest Expense 100 100 100.0 100.0
Int on Lns & Leases/Lns & Leases 10.9 11.5 11.4 11.1
Int on Securities/Tot Securities 5.8 7.3 8.0 7.9
Int on Deposits/Total Deposits 4.6 4.4 4.8 5.3
Interest Income/Total Assets 8.9 8.1 8.7 8.8
Interest Expense/Total Assets 4.1 4.0 4.4 4.8
Net Income/Total Assets 0.4 -0.7 -0.4 0.8
Net Income/Equity Capital 3.9 -18.0 -5.2 8.6
Net Income/Interest Income 5.0 -7.3 -4.8 8.9
Ln & Lease Loss Prov/Lns & Leases 0.5 1.5 1.4 0.7
Number of Employees Per Million
Dollars of Assets 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6
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Comparison Group I
Selected Assets & Liabilities
Banks with $50-300 Million in Assets
Avg. Avg. Avg Non
HBB MinBank MinBank
ASSETS
Cash and Due from Depositories
Total Securities Held
U.S. Treas. & Govt Securities
All Other Securities
Federal Funds Sold, etc.
Loans and Leases, Net
Real Estate
Commercial and Industrial
Consumer
All Other
Less Unern Inc & LN Loss Prov
All Other Assets
TOTAL ASSETS
LIABILITIES
Domestic Deposits, IPC
Deposits of U.S. Government
Deposits of States & Pol Subd
All Other Domestic Deposits
Total Domestic Deposits
Foreign Deposits
Total Deposits
Federal Funds Purchased, etc.
Oth Liabs For Borrowed Money
Notes & Debent Sub To Deps
All Other Liabilities
Total Liabilities
EQUITY CAPITAL
Perpetual Prefer & Common Stk
Surplus
Undiv Profit & Capital Reserve
Cumul Fgn Cur Translation Adj
Total Equity Capital
Total Liabilities and Equity Capital
10,176
40,397
34,129
6,268
10,344
41,002
24,535
13,008
3,695
928
1,164
4,442
7,673
27,575
23,939
3,636
8,038
56,745
34,521
16,266
4,756
2,550
1,349
5,412
6,213
34,261
26,308
7,952
5,632
59,887
34,236
11,575
11,200
4,436
1,561
4,695
Percent Distribution
Avg. Avg Avg
HBB MBK NMB
%of Total Assets
8.7 7.3 5.6
37.8 26.2 31.0
33.1 22.7 23.8
4.7 3.4 7.2
9.5 7.6 5.1
39.8 53.8 54.1
24.4 32.7 30.9
11.8 15.4 10.5
3.8 4.5 10.1
1.0 2.4 4.0
1.2 1.3 1.4
4.3 5.1 4.2
106,360 105,446 110,689 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of Total Deposits
73,863 82,439 90,868 77.7 86.0 92.8
9,998 3,586 185 8.6 3.7 0.2
11,010 5,435 5,297 12.0 5.7 5.4
1,518 4,374 1,512 1.8 4.6 1.5
96,603 95,835 97,864 100.0 100.0 99.9
0 0 88 0.0 0.0 0.1
96,603 95,835 97,952 100.0 100.0 100.0
205 350 1,717 0.3 0.4 1.7
1,491 559 609 2.0 0.6 0.6
36 175 116 0.1 0.2 0.1
1,026 1,314 1,080 1.1 1.3 1.1
99,361 98,236 101,476 %of Total Liabilities
3.4 2.5 3.5
% of Assets
1,528 2,725 1,339 1.7 2.6 1.2
2,536 2,979 3,301 2.5 2.8 3.0
2,936 1,505 4,571 2.4 1.4 4.1
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6,999 7,210 9,212 6.6 6.8 8.3
106,360 105,446 110,689
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Appendix I cont'd
Comparison Group I
Income and Expenses
Banks with $50-300 Million in Assets
Avg.
HBB
Avg. Avg. Non-
Min. Bank Min. Bank
INTEREST INCOME
Int & Fees On Loans & Leases
Int in Bal with Depository Inst
Incm on Federal Funds Sold, etc
Int & Divid Incm on Securities
Incm/Assets Held: Trading Acct
Total Interest Income
INTEREST EXPENSE
Interest on Deposits
Expense of Fed Funds Prchsd
Interest on Oth Borrowed Money
Other Interest Expense
Total Interest Expense
Provisions
Service Charges on Deposit Acct
Other NonInterest Income
Gains on Secur not in Trad Acct
Salaries & Employees Benefits
Other Nonlnterest Expense
Incm Before Taxes & Extraord Itm
Applicable Taxes
Income Before Extraord Items
Extraordinary Items, Net
Net Income
Number of Employees
Number of Banks
4,695
49
463
3,204
0
6,379
136
461
2,157
0
6,509
97
342
2,566
5
8,411 9,135 9,522
3,700 4,548 5,022
30 37 94
60 29 32
23 26 8
3,813 4,641 5,158
533 637 526
1,175 763 450
416 693 615
191 162 59
2,447 2,262 1,687
2,645 2,614 1,991
755 599 1,284
192 290 376
563 308 908
14 9 11
577 317 919
59
4,745
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Comparison Group I
Per Cent Distribution of Income and Expenses
Banks with $50-300 Million in Assets
Avg. Avg. Avg. Non-
HBB Min. Bank Min. Bank
Per Cent of Interest Income
Int And Fees on Loans & Leases 56.1 69.8 68.4
Int in Bal with Depository Inst 0.6 1.5 1.0
Incm on Federal Funds Sold, etc 6.3 5.0 3.6
Int & Divid Incm on Securities 37.0 23.6 26.9
Incm/Assets Held: Trading Acct 0.0 0.0 0.1
Total Interest Income 100.0 100.0 100.0
Per Cent of Interest Expense
Interest on Deposits 97.1 98.0 97.4
Expense of Fed Funds Prchsd 0.7 0.8 1.8
Interest on Oth Borrowed Money 1.5 0.6 0.6
Other Interest Expense 0.7 0.6 0.2
Total Interest Expense 100.0 100.0 100.0
Int on Lns & Leases/Lns & Leases 11.3 11.0 10.8
Int on Securities/Tot Securities 7.9 8.1 7.8
Int on Deposits/Total Deposits 3.9 4.8 5.2
Interest Income/Total Assets 8.1 8.8 8.8
Interest Expense/Total Assets 3.7 4.5 4.7
Net Income/Total Assets 0.5 0.3 0.8
Net Income/Equity Capital 6.8 4.4 10.1
Net Income/Interest Income 5.9 3.5 9.7
Ln & Lease Loss Prov/Lns & Leases 1.3 1.1 0.9
Number of Employees Per Million
Dollars of Assets 0.8 0.7 0.5
Appendix J
Comparison Groups
Selected Assets & Liabilities
Banks with $25-50 Million in Assets
Avg.
HBB
ASSETS
Cash and Due from Depositories
Total Securities Held
U.S. Treas. & Govt Securities
All Other Securities
Federal Funds Sold, etc.
Loans and Leases, Net
Real Estate
Commercial and Industrial
Consumer
All Other
Less Unern Inc & LN Loss Prov
All Other Assets
TOTAL ASSETS
LIABILITIES
Domestic Deposits, IPC
Deposits of U.S. Government
Deposits of States & Pol Subd
All Other Domestic Deposits
Total Domestic Deposits
Foreign Deposits
Total Deposits
Federal Funds Purchased, etc.
Oth Liabs For Borrowed Money
Notes & Debent Sub To Deps
All Other Liabilities
Total Liabilities
EQUITY CAPITAL
Perpetual Prefer & Common Stk
Surplus
Undiv Profit & Capital Reserve
Cumul Fgn Cur Translation Adj
Total Equity Capital
Total Liabilities and Equity Capital
3,359
7,395
6,248
1,147
3,145
16,316
9,259
4,766
2,461
271
442
1,347
Avg. Avg Non
MinBank MinBank
3,027
7,590
6,716
873
3,011
17,421
10,424
4,983
2,167
401
556
1,726
2,494
11,787
9,460
2,327
2,167
18,315
9,435
3,153
3,456
2,757
488
1,520
Percent Distribution
Avg. Avg Avg
HBB MBK NMB
%of Total Assets
9.5 9.2 6.9
24.6 23.2 32.5
20.5 20.5 26.1
4.1 2.7 6.4
10.1 9.2 6.0
51.6 53.2 50.5
27.3 31.8 26.0
16.4 15.2 8.7
8.5 6.6 9.5
0.9 1.2 7.6
1.5 1.7 1.3
4.1 5.3 4.2
31,561 32,777 36,283 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of Total Deposits
24,577 25,604 29,718 87.7 88.7 91.9
1,346 806 55 5.1 2.8 0.2
1,649 1,343 2,142 5.9 4.7 6.6
375 1,121 429 1.3 3.9 1.3
27,947 28,876 32,346 100.0 100.0 100.0
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
27,947 28,876 32,346 100.0 100.0 100.0
0 532 227 0.0 1.8 0.7
178 304 63 0.9 1.0 0.2
59 17 4 0.2 0.1 0.0
312 314 366 1.1 1.0 1.1
28,496 30,045 33,007 % of Total Liabilities
2.2 3.9 2.0
% of Assets
1,232 1,234 587 4.0 3.8 1.6
1,831 1,531 1,284 6.3 4.7 3.5
-141 -34 1,401 -0.4 -0.1 3.9
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2,922 2,732 3,272 9.8 8.3 9.0
31,418 32,777 36,283
Appendix J cont'd
Comparison Groups
Income and Expenses
Banks with $25-50 Million in Assets
Avg.
HBB
Avg. Avg. Non-
Min. Bank Min. Bank
INTEREST INCOME
Int & Fees On Loans & Leases
Int in Bal with Depository Inst
Incm on Federal Funds Sold, etc
Int & Divid Incm on Securities
Incm/Assets Held: Trading Acct
Total Interest Income
INTEREST EXPENSE
Interest on Deposits
Expense of Fed Funds Prchsd
Interest on Oth Borrowed Money
Other Interest Expense
Total Interest Expense
Provisions
Service Charges on Deposit Acct
Other Noninterest Income
Gains on Secur not in Trad Acct
Salaries & Employees Benefits
Other Noninterest Expense
Incm Before Taxes & Extraord Itm
Applicable Taxes
Income Before Extraord Items
Extraordinary Items, Net
Net Income
1,869
92
229
559
0
2,089
72
173
595
1
2,062
61
124
906
1
2,749 2,931 3,156
1,357 1,434 1,689
2 14 10
11 23 2
5 7 1
1,375 1,480 1,704
226 252 135
323 291 174
82 126 134
9 35 17
734 755 584
972 995 659
-143 -97 398
34 51 125
-177 -148 273
0 7 9
-177 -141 281
20
2,918
Number of Employees
Number of Banks
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Comparison Group J
Per Cent Distribution of Income and Expenses
Banks with $25-50 Million in Assets
Avg. Avg. Avg. Non-
HBB Min. Bank Min. Bank
Per Cent of Interest Income
Int And Fees on Loans & Leases
Int in Bal with Depository Inst
Incm on Federal Funds Sold, etc
Int & Divid Incm on Securities
Incm/Assets Held: Trading Acct
Total Interest Income
Per Cent of Interest Expense
Interest on Deposits
Expense of Fed Funds Prchsd
Interest on Oth Borrowed Money
Other Interest Expense
Total Interest Expense
Int on Lns & Leases/Lns & Leases
Int on Securities/Tot Securities
Int on Deposits/Total Deposits
Interest Income/Total Assets
Interest Expense/Total Assets
Net Income/Total Assets
Net Income/Equity Capital
Net Income/Interest Income
Ln & Lease Loss Prov/Lns & Leases
Number of Employees Per Million
Dollars of Assets
67.9
2.5
8.1
21.5
0.0
71.3
2.5
5.9
20.3
0.0
65.3
1.9
3.9
28.7
0.0
100.0 100.0 100.0
98.5 96.9 99.1
0.2 0.9 0.6
1.0 1.6 0.2
0.4 0.5 0.1
100.0 100.0 100.0
11.5
7.3
4.4
8.1
4.0
-0.7
-18.0
-7.3
1.5
0.7
11.4
8.0
4.8
8.7
4.4
-0.4
-5.2
-4.8
1.4
0.7
11.1
7.9
5.3
8.8
4.8
0.8
8.6
8.9
0.7
0.6
Appendix K
Comparison Groups
Selected Assets & Liabilities
Banks with $10-25 Million in Assets
ASSETS
Cash and Due from Depositories
Total Securities Held
U.S. Treas. & Govt Securities
All Other Securities
Federal Funds Sold, etc.
Loans and Leases, Net
Real Estate
Commercial and Industrial
Consumer
All Other
Less Unern Inc & LN Loss Prov
All Other Assets
TOTAL ASSETS
LIABILITIES
Domestic Deposits, IPC
Deposits of U.S. Government
Deposits of States & Pol Subd
All Other Domestic Deposits
Total Domestic Deposits
Foreign Deposits
Total Deposits
Federal Funds Purchased, etc.
Oth Liabs For Borrowed Money
Notes & Debent Sub To Deps
All Other Liabilities
Total Liabilities
EQUITY CAPITAL
Perpetual Prefer & Common Stk
Surplus
Undiv Profit & Capital Reserve
Cumul Fgn Cur Translation Adj
Total Equity Capital
Total Liabilities and Equity Capital
Percent Distribution
Avg. Avg. Avg Non Avg. Avg Avg
HBB MinBank MinBank HBB MBK NMB
% of Total Assets
1,588 2,260 1,419 9.9 12.6 8.0
5,742 4,851 5,779 32.0 27.1 32.7
5,224 4,339 4,802 28.8 24.2 27.2
518 512 976 3.2 2.9 5.5
1,139 1,702 1,166 6.2 9.5 6.6
7,815 8,029 8,544 45.1 44.8 48.4
4,354 4,382 3,872 25.8 24.5 21.9
1,779 1,548 1,333 10.0 8.6 7.6
1,746 2,182 1,638 9.7 12.2 9.3
270 253 1,938 1.5 1.4 11.0
335 336 239 1.9 1.9 1.4
1,132 1,059 743 6.8 5.9 4.2
17,416 17,904 17,652 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of Total Deposits
13,118 13,891 14,401 81.4 85.9 91.6
435 275 22 4.0 1.7 0.1
2,118 1,612 1,111 13.5 10.0 7.1
178 390 182 1.1 2.4 1.2
15,849 16,169 15,717 100.0 100.0 100.0
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
15,849 16,169 15,717 100.0 100.0 100.0
70 227 76 0.5 1.4 0.5
35 21 33 0.3 0.1 0.2
30 17 1 0.2 0.1 0.0
159 156 168 1.0 0.9 1.1
16,143 16,592 15,997 % of Total Liabilities
2.0 2.5 1.8
% of Assets
694 752 320 4.0 4.2 1.8
940 944 705 5.3 5.3 4.0
-361 -385 629 -1.6 -2.3 3.6
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1,273 1,311 1,654 7.6 7.3 9.4
17,416 17,904 17,652
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Comparison Groups
Income and Expenses
Banks with $10-25 Million in Assets
Avg. Avg. Avg. Non-
HBB Min. Bank Min. Bank
INTEREST INCOME
Int & Fees On Loans & Leases
Int in Bal with Depository Inst
Incm on Federal Funds Sold, etc
Int & Divid Incm on Securities
Incm/Assets Held: Trading Acct
Total Interest Income
INTEREST EXPENSE
Interest on Deposits
Expense of Fed Funds Prchsd
Interest on Oth Borrowed Money
Other Interest Expense
Total Interest Expense
Provisions
Service Charges on Deposit Acct
Other Nonlnterest Income
Gains on Secur not in Trad Acct
Salaries & Employees Benefits
Other NonInterest Expense
Incm Before Taxes & Extraord Itm
Applicable Taxes
Income Before Extraord Items
Extraordinary Items, Net
Net Income
930
26
118
390
0
970
87
117
360
0
980
43
64
451
0
1,464 1,535 1,540
697 727 821
3 2 4
2 1 1
4 2 0
705 733 828
86 114 61
284 248 87
101 99 65
30 23 7
493 4,462 307
620 578 331
-25 19 172
6 33 55
-31 -13 116
4 5 6
-27 -7 120
10
2,258
Number of Employees
Number of Banks
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Comparison Groups
Per Cent Distribution of Income and Expenses
Banks with $10-25 Million in Assets
Avg.
HBB
Avg. Avg. Non-
Min. Bank Min. Bank
Per Cent of Interest Income
Int And Fees on Loans & Leases
Int in Bal with Depository Inst
Incm on Federal Funds Sold, etc
Int & Divid Incm on Securities
Incm/Assets Held: Trading Acct
Total Interest Income
Per Cent of Interest Expense
Interest on Deposits
Expense of Fed Funds Prchsd
Interest on Oth Borrowed Money
Other Interest Expense
Total Interest Expense
Int on Lns & Leases/Lns & Leases
Int on Securities/Tot Securities
Int on Deposits/Total Deposits
Interest Income/Total Assets
Interest Expense/Total Assets
Net Income/Total Assets
Net Income/Equity Capital
Net Income/Interest Income
Ln & Lease Loss Prov/Lns & Leases
Number of Employees Per Million
Dollars of Assets
63.0
1.8
8.7
26.6
0.0
63.2
5.7
7.6
23.5
0.0
63.6
2.8
4.2
29.3
0.0
100.0 100.0 100.0
98.7 99.2 99.2
0.4 0.3 0.5
0.4 0.1 0.1
0.6 0.3 0.1
100.0 100.0 100.0
12.0
7.3
4.3
8.3
4.0
-0.2
-1.6
-1.8
1.1
1.0
11.6
7.7
4.4
8.5
4.1
-0.1
-0.5
-0.5
1.4
0.9
11.3
7.9
5.3
8.9
4.8
0.7
7.3
7.8
0.7
0.6
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Comparison Groups
Selected Assets & Liabilities
Banks with Under $10 Million in Assets
Avg. Avg. Avg Non
HBB MinBank MinBank
ASSETS
Cash and Due from Depositories
Total Securities Held
U.S. Treas. & Govt Securities
All Other Securities
Federal Funds Sold, etc.
Loans and Leases, Net
Real Estate
Commercial and Industrial
Consumer
All Other
Less Unern Inc & LN Loss Prov
All Other Assets
TOTAL ASSETS
LIABILITIES
Domestic Deposits, IPC
Deposits of U.S. Government
Deposits of States & Pol Subd
All Other Domestic Deposits
Total Domestic Deposits
Foreign Deposits
Total Deposits
Federal Funds Purchased, etc.
Oth Liabs For Borrowed Money
Notes & Debent Sub To Deps
All Other Liabilities
Total Liabilities
EQUITY CAPITAL
Perpetual Prefer & Common Stk
Surplus
Undiv Profit & Capital Reserve
Cumul Fgn Cur Translation Adj
Total Equity Capital
Total Liabilities and Equity Capital
1,471
1,311
1,235
76
1,102
3,122
2,486
396
466
46
271
458
1,328
1,806
1,636
169
826
3,162
2,051
538
542
251
220
430
755
2,135
1,884
251
629
3,146
1,199
429
688
930
101
334
Percent Distribution
Avg. Avg Avg
HBB MBK NMB
% of Total Assets
19.4 17.6 10.8
16.4 23.9 30.5
15.6 21.7 26.9
0.9 2.2 3.6
15.4 10.9 9.0
42.6 41.9 44.9
34.5 27.2 17.1
5.2 7.1 6.1
5.9 7.2 9.8
0.7 3.3 13.3
3.7 2.9 1.4
6.2 5.7 4.8
7,464 7,553 7,001 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of Total Deposits
5,777 5,724 5,351 82.3 82.8 89.3
740 690 11 11.8 10.0 0.2
322 381 561 4.4 5.5 9.4
104 113 65 1.5 1.6 1.1
6,942 6,909 5,989 100.0 100.0 100.0
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6,942 6,909 5,989 100.0 100.0 100.0
0 0 23 0.0 0.0 0.4
0 0 12 0.0 0.0 0.2
33 25 1 0.5 0.4 0.0
68 67 90 1.0 1.0 1.5
7,043 7,001 6,116 % of Total Liabilities
1.5 1.4 2.1
% of Assets
845 765 206 11.4 10.1 2.9
482 511 438 6.5 6.8 6.3
-907 -724 241 -12.4 -9.6 3.4
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
421 552 885 5.5 7.3 12.6
7,464 7,553 7,001
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Appendix L cont'd
Comparison Groups
Income and Expenses
Banks with $10-25 Million in Assets
Avg. Avg. Avg. Non-
HBB Min. Bank Min. Bank
INTEREST INCOME
Int & Fees On Loans & Leases
Int in Bal with Depository Inst
Incm on Federal Funds Sold, etc
Int & Divid Incm on Securities
Incm/Assets Held: Trading Acct
Total Interest Income
INTEREST EXPENSE
Interest on Deposits
Expense of Fed Funds Prchsd
Interest on Oth Borrowed Money
Other Interest Expense
Total Interest Expense
Provisions
Service Charges on Deposit Acct
Other Noninterest Income
Gains on Secur not in Trad Acct
Salaries & Employees Benefits
Other NonInterest Expense
Incm Before Taxes & Extraord Itm
Applicable Taxes
Income Before Extraord Items
Extraordinary Items, Net
Net Income
Number of Employees
Number of Banks
466
18
91
98
0
460
14
80
126
0
406
26
36
173
0
673 682 643
317 306 318
0 0 1
0 0 4
4 2 0
320 309 324
-3 23 23
148 138 37
45 54 110
2 1 2
373 362 173
523 445 199
-345 -263 70
0 0 24
-345 -263 46
0 0 1
-345 -263 47
5
469
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Appendix L cont'd
Comparison Groups
Per Cent Distribution of Income and Expenses
Banks with $10-25 Million in Assets
Avg. Avg. Avg. Non-
HBB Min. Bank Min. Bank
Per Cent of Interest Income
Int And Fees on Loans & Leases
Int in Bal with Depository Inst
Incm on Federal Funds Sold, etc
Int & Divid Incm on Securities
Incm/Assets Held: Trading Acct
Total Interest Income
Per Cent of Interest Expense
Interest on Deposits
Expense of Fed Funds Prchsd
Interest on Oth Borrowed Money
Other Interest Expense
Total Interest Expense
Int on Lns & Leases/Lns & Leases
Int on Securities/Tot Securities
Int on Deposits/Total Deposits
Interest Income/Total Assets
Interest Expense/Total Assets
Net Income/Total Assets
Net Income/Equity Capital
Net Income/Interest Income
Ln & Lease Loss Prov/Lns & Leases
Number of Employees Per Million
Dollars of Assets
68.5
3.0
13.2
15.2
0.0
67.4
2.1
11.7
18.5
0.0
63.1
4.0
5.6
26.9
0.0
100.0 100.0 100.0
98.5 99.0 98.1
0.0 0.0 0.3
0.0 0.0 1.2
1.5 0.6 0.0
100.0 100.0 100.0
15.2
9.0
4.3
8.6
4.2
-4.2
-99.6
-59.9
0.2
1.5
12.7
7.4
4.2
8.6
3.9
-3.3
-55.7
-38.6
0.7
1.6
11.8
8.0
5.2
8.9
4.5
0.6
4.5
6.5
0.7
0.7
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APPENDIX M
Boston CheckCashers' 1993 Price List
CHECK CASHING RATES
.01
1.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
50.00
55.00
70.00
80.00
100.01
110.00
115.00
120.00
130.00
135.00
140.00
145.00
150.00
155.00
160.00
165.00
170.00
175.00
180.00
185.00
190.00
195.00
TC
TOC
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
S .99.....0.25
9.99..... 0.35
14.99.....0.45
19.99...0.95
S24.99....1.20
29.99....1.35
34.99.....1.70
39.99....1.80
49.99....1.85
54.99.....2.00
69.99....2.05
79.99....2.20
100.00.... 2.45
109.99......2.70
114.99.....2.80
119.99.....2.85
129.99......2.90
134.99.....3.00
139.99.....3.05
144.99......3.10
149.99.....3.15
154.99.....3.25
159.99.....3.30
164.99.....3.35
169.99.....3.40
174.99.....3.45
179.99.....3.50
184.99.....3.55
189.99....3.60
194.99.....3.65
199.99.....3.70
200.00
205.00
210.00
215.00
220.00
225.00
230.00
235.00
240.00
245.00
250.00
255.00
260.00
265.00
270.00
275.00
280.00
285.00
290.00
295.00
300.00
305.00
310.00
320.00
325.00
330.00
335.00
340.00
345.00
350.00
355.00
360.00
365.00
370.00
375.00
380.00
385.00
390.00
395.00
400.00
405.00
410.00
415.00
420.00
425.00
430.00
435.00
440.00
445.00
450.00
455.00
460.00
465.00
470.00
.475.00
480.00
485.00
490.00
495.00
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
364.99....5.55
369.99......5.60
374.99.....5.65
379.99.....5.70
384.99.....5.75
389.99..-5.80
394.99....5.85
399.99.....5.90
404.99....6.00
409.99.....6.05
414.99......6.10
419.99......6.15
424.99......6.20
429.99......6.25
434.99......6.30
439.99.....6.35
444.99.....6.40
449.99......6.45
454.99......6.55
459.99.....6.60
464.99.....6.65
469.99.....6.70
474.99.....6.75
479.99.....6.80O
484.99......6.85
489.99....6.90
494.99......6.95
499.99......7.00
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
INCOME TAX CHECKS ....... 2.25%
LOTTERY CHECKS .................. 2.25%
INSURANCE CHECKS ........... 2.25%
ALL DRAFT .................... 2.25%
LAWYERS CHECKS .............. 2.25%
CHECKS $1,000 AND OVER ..... 2.25%
CHECKS $5,000 AND OVER ........ 3%
MONEY ORDERS ......................... 59 CENTS
UTILITY BILLS .............................. 59 CENTS
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204.99......3.80
209.99....3.85
214.99.....3.90
219.99.....3.95
224.99.....4.00
229.99......4.05
234.99.....4.10
239.99....4.15
244.99....4.20
249.99....4.30
254.99.....4.35
259.99......4.40
264.99.....4.45
269.99.....4.50
274.99.....4.55
279.99......4.60
284.99......4.65
289.99......4.70
294.99......4.75
299.99......4.80
304.99.....4.90
309.99......4.95
319.99....5.05
324.99......5.10
329.99......5.15
334.99....5.20
339.99....5.25
344.99......5.30
349.99....5.35
354.99......5.45
359.99.....5.50 OVER 500.00......1.85%
APPENDIX N
Boston Bank of Commerce
1993 Schedule of Banking Charges
BOSTON BANK
OF COMMERCE
SERVICE CHARGE SCHEDULE
REGULAR CHECKING
Monthly Fee ...................... 5.00
SPECIAL CHECKING
Monthly Fee ...................... 6.00
NOW/SUPER NOW CHECKING
Monthly Fee ...................... 8.00
MONEY MARKET ACCOUNT
Monthly Fee ..................... 10.00
Pwr tem chute aN aocoure .25
DEMAND DEPOSIT SERVICES
Overdraft Charge .................... 20.00
Uncollected Funds Charge ............. 20.00
Money Order Fees .................... 2.00
Cashiers/Certfied Checks ............... 5.00
Stop Payments ...................... 20.00
Research, per hour ................... 25.00
Collections, cost plus ................. 20.00
Womng and -upig
Telephone Transfers (money movers) ....... 2.00
Levies ........................... 35.00
Balance inquiry By Phone ............... 2.00
Balance Reporting .................... 5.00
Counter Checks, ive for................ 2.00
Wire Transfers ...................... 15.00
Oncoming and outgoing)
Credit/Audit Verification
or. ................... 25.00
Additional Stueent ................... .00
Special Statement .................... 12.00
Lost Passbook Fee ................... 10.00
Notary, per page................ ..... 5.00
Photocopies. per copy ................. 2.50
Charge Backs/Returned Items ........... 10.00
ACH Debits ........................ .50
ATM CHARGES
Charge Per Transaction ................. 1.00
Card Replacement Charge ............ 25.00
Effective 51/91
COMMERCIAL DEMAND DEPOSIT
ACCOUNTS
REGULAR BUSINESS CHECKING
* $500 minimum required to open account -
non interest bearing
* $12.00 monthly service charge
* $.75 base deposit fee
* $.09 per check deposited
* $.16 charge for each check paid by the
bank
* Earnings credit toward monthly service
charges is based on average investable
balances - rate changes monthly
NON-PROFIT CHECKING
* $100 minimum required to open account -
non interest bearing
* $12.00 monthly service charge
* $.75 base deposit fee
* $.09 per check deposited
* $.16 charged for each check paid by the
Bank
* Earnings credit toward monthly service
charges is based on average investable
balances - rate changes monthly
SUPER NOW
* $5000 minimum required to open account
* Variable interest rate based upon market
conditions
* Unlimited number of checks can be written
* Once balance falls below minimum, there
will be a monthly maintenance charge of
$12.00 and a $.25 per item charge
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